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Chapter 1

INBREEDING AND THE ACADEMIC LABOR MARKET

Recent attention to the need for the inclusion of minorities
and women in the professoriate has fostered renewed interest in
the operation of the academic marketplace.

Initially, this atten

tion was directed at entry-level faculty selection.

However, as

larger numbers of minority and female faculty have accrued longer
periods of service, the mechanisms and criteria for promotion and
tenure decisions have also become a subject of concern.

An example

of the recognition of the need for research on post-selection deci
sion processes can be found in the lament that "the relationship
of affirmative action to tenure has not been tackled by any appli
cant" in a 1977 report from the Fund for the Improvement of Post
secondary Education (The Fund for the Improvement of Postsecondary
Education, 1977, p. 3).
The Problem
In response to the need for further research on promotion and
tenure decisions, this study has examined one of the criteria used
in these decisions: inbreeding.

The relevance of this characteris

tic, which has been largely ignored in recent studies, was demon
strated by the inclusion of a provision that the University of
Minnesota waive its policy of not hiring its graduates for tenured
positions in the consent decree settling a recent sex discrimina-
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tion suit that attracted national attention (Broad, 1980).
The merits of institutional inbreeding have been a subject of
controversy in the higher education literature for sometime.

In

his University Administration, first published in 1908, Charles W.
Eliot assessed the practice:
It is natural, but not wise, for a college or university
to recruit its faculties chiefly from its own graduates—
natural, because these graduates are well known to the
selecting authorities, since they have been under
observation for years; unwise, because breeding in and
in has grave dangers for a university [p. 90].
Institutional origin has been used in selection, retention, promo
tion, and tenure decisions.

Caplow and McGee (1958) noted the

effects of origin in their classic study, The Academic Marketplace:
"Rules about ’inbreeding' and 'outbreeding' also account for a
fair number of involuntary terminations, the former being far more
common than the latter.... [inbreeding] is commonly disapproved
but widely practiced [p. 41]."
Inbreeding is important in any examination of wage and occupa
tional discrimination because of its major impact on women.

It

was included in the list of issues compiled by the Association of
American College's Project on the Status and Education of Women:
"Policies that forbid departments from hiring their own students
upon degree completion decrease the available pool of qualified
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female applicants and work a particular hardship on married women
who may not be mobile [Sandler, 1974, p. 7]."

The same concerns

were expressed by Gappa and Uehling (1979) in their monograph on
women in academe.

They lament the

lack of evidence about the effect of inbreeding policies.
Some researchers have suggested that as women typically
move where their spouses find employment, they are
limited in their choice of institutions at which they
can complete graduate work.

Rules prohibiting the

hiring of an institution's own graduates effectively
limit the opportunities for such women for employment
[1979, p. 51].
Lack of mobility due to marital or familial constraints is the most
often cited reason for inbreeding among women faculty.

Despite the

rise in dual-career marriages and the emphasis on equality, most
location decisions are resolved in favor of the male's job.

Wives

who follow the standard pattern of supporting their spouse through
his graduate work and then pursuing their own advanced work at the
institution at which he takes his first job may have little choice
about where they can seek employment.
Another reason for inbreeding in women faculty members is
affirmative action pressures.

An institution attempting to hire

nontraditional faculty may find that the easiest applicants to
attract are their own graduates.

Especially in fields where they
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are very rare, the surest way to find a woman or a minority person
for a faculty slot may be to recruit a graduate student.

To the

extent that this is true and that inbreeding is viewed as a nega
tive signal in faculty decisions, affirmative action pressure may
contribute to the poorer performance of nontraditionals within the
academic community over the long run.
Along with the possibility that it is more likely that women
are inbred, differential application of inbreeding prohibitions
leads to occupational discrimination.

Joan Abramson (1975) dis

cusses this possibility:
There is also some evidence that [the inbreeding] policy
is eased more often for men than for women.
provides examples of this phenomenon.

My own family

My husband went

from graduate student straight up to associate professor
at Stanford.

His career was not set back the least by

the fear of inbreeding.

Indeed, the minute he completed

his Ph.D. requirements his rank changed from acting
assistant professor to assistant professor.

In contrast,

my sister was told that UCLA could offer her only a
lectureship.

Even the lectureship was available only

because she was clearly one of the best qualified Ph.D.s
in her field for some years.

She was told that she was

lucky that her department had considered breaking the
rules for her and that the lectureship appointment most
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likely would not be extended beyond a single year
[p. 6].
Given the bias against inbreeding and given the evidence that women
may have greater reason to be inbred, it is important to examine
whether inbreeding is a reasonable variable in tenure, promotion,
retention, and selection decisions.
the question can be approached.

There are two levels at which

First, one can look at the insti

tutional effects of inbreeding: What are the effects of inbreeding
on collegial relations, curriculum, and other institutional char
acteristics?

Abramson noted the following:

Many universities refuse to employ their own graduates
in anything but temporary positions on the assumption
that . . . inbred

departments become stagnant and void

of the new ideas brought in by cross-fertilization from
other universities.

The theory is in itself less than

sound, for it assumes that graduates are permanently
fixed in their thinking by their training [1975, p. 6].
The institutional effects of inbreeding pose some interesting
research problems, but they are beyond the scope of this study.
The other approach to examining the impact of institutional
origin is at the level of the individual faculty member.

In the

context of the uncertainty about the treatment of minorities and
women, this approach leads to the question of whether the policies
regarding inbreeding lead to discrimination.

Consideration of this

6

question requires an understanding of the conditions in the academic
marketplace and an understanding of the theoretical bases for the
determination of discrimination.

For the purposes of this study,

an economic theory of discrimination provides the theoretical frame
work.

Following some background information on the academic labor

market, the remainder of the chapter discusses this theory of dis
crimination and, within that framework, examines inbreeding as a
job market signal which may lead to discrimination.
The Dilemma in the Academic Labor Market
A major theme in recent research on and popular discussion of
faculty concerns is the constriction of the academic labor market.
Projections of the overall demand for doctoral faculty show strongly
decreasing trends between 1980 and 1995 (Cartter, 1976; Fernandez,
1978).

Projections of new doctorate hires reflect the same trend.

Fernandez’s baseline projection (assuming a constant student-faculty
ratio) shows a downward trend from 10,500 new hires in 1980 to only
1,000 new hires in 1995.

Although this projection is not a mono-

tonically decreasing curve, it does show a precipitous decline in
new faculty hiring over the next 15 years.

Cartter (.1976) combines

projections of doctoral completions and junior faculty openings to
develop a 5-year discounted estimate of the excess or shortage of
doctoral job seekers.

This estimate of faculty openings show the

same pattern as Fernandez's projection.

Cartter predicts 16,100

junior faculty openings for 1980 and 2,200 for 1990, the last year
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in the projected series.

Through the same period, his 5-year dis

counted excess of doctorate holders rises from 72,700 in 1980 to
a peak of 122,200 in 1986.
have declined to 91,500.

By 1990, the surplus is projected to
Although the Fernandez data for the

post-1955 period shows increasing demand it is clear that the
academic market for new hires and junior faculty will not be robust
in the next 15 years.
At the same time that the total demand and the new doctorate
hires are rapidly declining, the fraction of faculty holding tenure
is rising.

Although the new faculty openings in the 1980s will be

few, many people hired in more affluent times will come up for pro
motion and tenure decisions during that period.

The decreasing

importance of new appointments is shown in Cartter’s analysis of
the market for junior faculty which projects only 1,200 openings
in 1984.

The same model projected 17,300 hires for 1979 (Cartter,

1976, p. 143).

In 1984, when there is little discretion in the

management of faculty through openings in the junior ranks, there
will be a much greater opportunity for decision making at the
later career stages.

Facing a severely depressed market for new

faculty hires, it is clear that the critical decisions concerning
faculty in the 1980s and 1990s will be in retention, promotion, and
tenure.
At the same time, another significant theme in much of the
literature on the professoriate is the need for a broader range of
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participation.

Traditionally, the faculty in postsecondary insti

tutions have been exclusively or predominantly white and male.
Exceptions to this demographic trend are few.

Some specialties

hold "pink-collar" status (for example, nursing and home economics)
but in most departments where a significant proportion of the stu
dents is female, the faculty is predominantly male (for example,
elementary or secondary education, English or Art). Predominantly
black institutions offer an exception to the white and male rule.
However, the overall impact of these exceptions is slight and there
is a demonstrated need to incorporate nontraditional faculty (women
and minorities) into the mainstream of higher education (Carnegie,
1973; Newman, Note 3, p. 3).
The difficulty of increasing the number of nontraditional
faculty was observed by Newman:
It has proven far easier to help James Meredith past the
governor and into the University of Mississippi than it
has to increase the number of black faculty.

It has

proven easier to increase the number of women attending
schools of business than the number of women deans of
schools of business [Note 3, pp. 1-2],
This research will emphasize women as a subset of nontradi
tional faculty.

But while specific structural questions to be

examined are particularly relevant to women, the general discussion
of discrimination applies both to women and minorities.

9

The real gains In faculty status for women have not been
large.

Bernice Sandler (Note 4, p. 2) has compiled a "Small list

of horrors":
Although there has been an increase in the number of
women at the assistant professor level, these gains
are not matched by gains in promotions; there has been
no comparable gain in tenured ranks.
In 1977-78, the modal rank for men was full pro
fessor.

For women the modal rank was assistant pro

fessor.
In 1973, the salary gap between academic men and
women was 16.7%.
In 1977, it was up to 20.5% and still widening.
There are several indications that a far greater
percentage of women than men are hired for non-ladder
positions rather than those leading to tenure.
Women are still promoted more slowly than men.
The unemployment rate for women Ph.D.'s in the
sciences and social sciences is 2-4 times that of men.
Sandler goes on to summarize her findings, including the observation
that "the higher the rank, the fewer the women" (Note 4, p. 2).
As the Newman (Note 3) and Sandler (Note 4) quotations imply,
nontraditional faculty have a "pipeline" problem.

Tenured, full

professor status cannot be achieved overnight, nor can it be in-
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herited or won by lottery.

A necessary, but not sufficient, ingre

dient in the transformation of an assistant to a full professor is
time.

To increase nontraditional participation in higher faculty

ranks, women and minorities must not only be recruited but also
retained, promoted, and tenured.
The goal of increasing the participation of nontraditional
faculty and the reality of decreasing total demand for faculty are
often in conflict (Linnell, Note 3). Sandler (Note 4,

p. 2) notes

the impact of this situation on women:
With the financial crisis in higher education and the
subsequent cutbacks in some faculties, many women have
also lost positions, for being less likely to have
tenure, they have been the firstto be terminated.
Given the dismal, near-term predictions fordemand for faculty, it
is all too possible that those terminated may not be able to find
employment in academia.

Indeed, the newly-opened door may be a

revolving one.
The only way to fairly increase nontraditional participation
in higher ranks, and during times of cutbacks to retain their fair
representation, is to ensure that retention, promotion, and tenure
decisions are free from any type of discrimination.

An exploration

of possible discrimination in these decisions requires the selec
tion of a theory of discrimination.
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An Economic Theory of Discrimination
In the examination of equity in a beleagured marketplace, a
sufficient theory of discrimination will provide a basis for iden
tifying existing patterns of discrimination and for determining
whether the pressures of constricting demand are contributing to
the perpetuation of the discrimination.

Several disciplines have

made significant contributions to the understanding of the discrim
inatory process.

As the most complete, comprehensive, and rele

vant theoretical base is found in labor economics, it will be used
in this study.
Modern labor theory is based on the neoclassical marginal
productivity theory of wages augmented by assumptions about the
activity in the marketplace.

Discrimination, or as it was formerly

termed, exploitation, is usually defined as "the payment to labor
of a wage less than its marginal revenue product (Cartter, 1959,
p. 65)".

This definition states that wages should be a function

of productivity and net increases in revenue.

Since the marginal

revenue per unit is constant regardless of the identity of the
worker who produced the unit, the definition reduces to equation
(1) when viewing the wage differentials between laborers producing
identical goods.

where

wi

=

f^pi^

^

w^

=

wages of worker i

p^

=

productivity level of worker i
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The demand for labor, as the demand for any productive resource,
is a function of the marginal revenue product of the worker and the
wage rate.

Assuming a homogeneous marginal wage rate and a homo

geneous product, the quantity of labor employed is also a function
of productivity:
QL = s(pL)

where

(2)

= the quantity of labor employed
PL = the productivity of labor.

Given the two fundamental relationships cited in equations
(1) and (2), discrimination can be defined as the violation of one
or both of the relations to the detriment of one segment of the
labor force.

Madden (1973) provides a detailed analysis of these

discriminatory acts and includes an additional category in her book
on The Economics of Sex Discrimination.

She cites three types of

discrimination:
1.

Wage discrimination, which occurs when wage differen

tials are not based on relative productivity differences;
2.

Occupational discrimination, which occurs when cri

teria other than productivity determine the quantity of
a factor employed in a given occupation;
3.

Cumulative discrimination, which occurs when a factor

has a lower level of productivity due to past discrimi
nation [p. 2].
The neoclassical definition of discrimination, violation of the
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relationship cited in equation (1), corresponds to Madden's first
category, wage discrimination.

Her second category is the equiva

lent of the violation of the accepted definition of demand for
productive resources shown in equation (2).

There is not a theo

retical equivalent of cumulative discrimination although labor
economists have recently addressed the problem in terms of parti
cipation in and barriers to entry into the marketplace.
The identification of wage and occupational discrimination is
important to this research.
ing

An extension of labor theory describ

the market mechanism which matches productivity with employ

ment opportunities and wages is needed to more fully understand
the potential for discrimination.
There are three types of economic theories of discrimination.
The types are based on the subject used to explain apparent imper
fections in the marketplace: information, taste, and power (Addison
Siebert, 1979, p. 202).

The information-based approach is most

relevant for this study of the academic marketplace.
The consideration of the role of information in the labor mar
ket has been refined through the analysis of job market signaling.
Because employers cannot directly observe future productivity, they
must use surrogates in the employment decision-making process.
When prospective employees exhibit job-related characteristics,
they are said to be signaling employers about their future produc
tivity.

Spence C1973) has developed a model of information feedback
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in the job market.

Insert Figure 1 about here

In his model, prospective employees provide information (signals)
about themselves.

Employers translate these signals into expecta

tions about the applicants' marginal productivity through the use
of conditional probabilistic beliefs about the relationship between
signaling patterns and future productivity.
a wage based on the expected productivity.

The employer offers
Applicants choose which

signals to send based on a desire to maximize the excess of the
achieved wage rate over the cost of signaling.
Because of the feedback effect embedded in the iterative pro
cess, employers should receive frequent information on the validity
of their beliefs about the relationship between a given signal and
productivity.

Spence notes that "the system will be stationary if

the employer starts out with conditional probabilistic beliefs
that after one round are not disconfirmed by the incoming data they
generate [1973, p. 360].
It is the efficiency of this adjustment mechanism which is
critical to the long-run abolition of discrimination in the market
place.

To the extent that incorrect employer beliefs about the

relationship between signals and productivity are not corrected by
experience, invalid beliefs can perpetuate wage and occupational
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EMPLOYER'S CONDITIONAL
PROBABILISTIC BELIEFS

OFFERED WAGE SCHEDULE AS
A FUNCTION OF SIGNALS
AND INDICES

HIRING, OBSERVATION OF
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
MARGINAL PRODUCT AND
SIGNALS

SIGNALING DECISIONS BY
APPLICANTS; MAXIMIZATION
OF RETURN NET OF SIGNALING
COSTS

SIGNALING COSTS

FIGURE 1: INFORMATIONAL FEEDBACK IN THE JOB MARKET
SOURCE: SPENCE (1973, P. 359)
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discrimination.

Several authors have questioned the efficiency of

this mechanism.

Addison and Siebert (1979) note the need for up

dating information:
Because information about . . . changes is costly to
obtain, the process of updating will never be complete.
Consequently, it is quite likely that the empirical
rules developed will be outdated and that incorrect
or biased decisions will tend on average to be made.
This tendency will be exaggerated during periods of
rapid change [p. 208].
The inability of the feedback mechanism to adjust for rapid changes
in the signal-productivity relationship is exacerbated when the
change relates to an embedded group.

The latter is an identifiable

group of workers which is not separated from and assumed to be
homogeneous with another group.

In this case, the change in the

signal-productivity relationship for the embedded group will be
masked by the constant function relating to the other, and probably
dominant, group.

To the extent that the employers' conditional

probability distributions are not corrected to reflect the reality
of the embedded group, discrimination will occur in a form, which,
given the usually naive "equal treatment" interpretations of the
term, will be extremely difficult to identify.
Spence's (1973) model utilizes two levels of productivity and
demonstrates that job-seekers in the low productivity group will
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utilize a signal that represents low productivity and that job
seekers in the high-productivity group still utilize a signal that
represents high productivity.

Membership in a particular group

does not influence signaling behavior.
several assumptions.

This result relies on

One is critical to this study.

Spence

assumes that the incidence of signaling costs is the same for all
groups.

This study examines a case in which signaling costs are

different for each of two groups.

Therefore, the results of

Spence's work relating productivity with signaling behavior do not
apply.
Assume there are two groups (one and two), and the signaling
costs are unequal so that the cost of signaling high productivity
for group one always exceeds that of group two.

If workers choose

signals to mazimize the achieved wage rate net of the costs of sig
naling, highly productive members of group one will signal low
productivity as long as the difference between the wages for high
producers and low producers does not exceed the incremental signal
ing costs.

It will only be worthwhile for a highly productive

group one job-seeker to

signal high productivity if the wage dif

ferential to be gained exceeds the cost of signaling.

Under these

conditions, the labor market may effectively discriminate against
group one members if it maintains a signal-productivity relation
ship that speciously assumes equal signaling costs.

Occupational

and wage discrimination can only be avoided if the market recognizes
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the true relationship between group one signaling patterns and
productivity.

This result differs from Spence's (197.3) in that it

assumes that the impact of group membership is felt through dif
fering signaling costs rather than through the signaling market
mechanism.
Institutional Origin as a Job Market Signal
The impact of institutional origin as a job market signal in
faculty personnel decisions depends on the employing institution's
expectations about the relationship between inbreeding and pro
ductivity.

The prevalence of prohibitions against the retention,

promotion, and tenure of inbred individuals reflects the pattern
of expectations described in equations (3), (4), and (5).

E(j>i h ) ■ po

(3)

E(Pi|yQ) = p^ with a probability

(4)

E(Pi|y0) = Pq with a probability

(5)

of 1 ^
where y^

= inbred signal

Yq

= noninbred signal

Pq

= low productivity

p^

= high productivity
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If an applicant is inbred, the employer assumes lower productivity.
Of the noninbred group, employers will assume some proportion (q^)
will have high productivity and the rest will not.

Spence's (JL973)

analysis would dictate that no high producer would choose to send
the inbred signal.

However, when the complication of differential

signaling costs is introduced, it is clear that a high producer
will signal inbred as long as the costs of signaling noninbred ex
ceed the incremental wage to be gained.

Spence notes that the

"signaling costs are to be interpreted broadly to include psychic
and other costs, as well as the direct monetary ones [1973, p. 359J."
The constraints on women's location decisions cited previously act
to increase the cost of signaling outbred.

Given this assumption,

the decision rule cited in equation (3) will discriminate against
women.
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship of
inbreeding to productivity and institutional rewards and to deter
mine how that relationship varies between men and women.

The

results will provide data for evaluating whether inbreeding pro
hibitions constitute occupational and wage discrimination against
women.
Research Hypotheses
The primary goal of the research is to examine the relation
ship of sex and institutional origin to productivity.

Stated more

formally, this becomes the following hypothesis which will guide
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this study: Female inbred faculty have patterns of productivity
which are significantly different from the patterns of productivity
of male inbred faculty.
The data base and methodology will also allow a reexamination
and extension of the existing work on the relationships between
inbreeding and professional and economic advancement.

There are

two additional research hypotheses which reflect these relation
ships :
inbred faculty show less professional advancement than outbred
faculty;
inbred faculty receive fewer institutional rewards than outbred faculty.
The balance of this dissertation describes the research under
taken: the pertinent literature will be reviewed in Chapter 2; the
methodology discussed in Chapter 3; the results presented in Chap
ter 4; and the study summarized in Chapter 5.

Chapter 2
THE LITERATURE

An examination of the literature relevant to the research hypo
theses cited in Chapter 1 should include surveys of the work on
inbreeding, productivity, and rewards.

In the first section of

this chapter, the scope and results of previous studies on inbreed
ing will be examined.

The second section reviews the operationali

zation of productivity in faculty research, with the emphasis placed
on ways of measuring this concept.

Because this research is focused

on the relation of productivity to inbreeding, no review is made of
the literature which describes the relation between productivity
and other variables.

In the last section, the literature on both

reward measures and on methodological approaches for determining
wage discrimination is reviewed.
Inbreeding
In an examination of the literature on inbreeding, several
aspects of the studies are of particular importance.

First, defi

nitions of the phenomenon itself are often problematic.

Should

faculty with any degree from their employing institutions be con
sidered inbred or should this category be limited to those who work
at the institution which granted their terminal degree?

Does it

matter if an individual has worked at institutions other than his
or her alma mater?
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Earlier studies use very general criteria for identifying
inbred faculty (i.e., any degree from the institution at which the
individual is teaching is sufficient for inbred classification).
Later studies usually deal with more sophisticated concepts such
as "silver cording" (Hargens & Farr, 1973) which refers to faculty
members who have taught for some time at institutions other than
the ones from which they graduated and then returned to their alma
mater.

The implication of this phenomenon is that the continuing

connection between the home institution and its graduate is suffi
ciently strong and positive to draw the faculty member back after
a "seasoning" period elsewhere.

More recent studies reflect the

increasing importance of terminal degrees as a qualification for
faculty positions by emphasizing doctoral training in the identi
fication of inbred subjects.
A second important aspect of inbreeding studies is their
explicit or implied assumptions about the reasons why institutions
disfavor, favor, practice, or avoid inbreeding.

To the extent that

these assumptions do not reflect reality or that an institution's
practices do not match its philosophy, there is a clear need to
question the difference

as it may lead to unfair discrimination

against some faculty members.
The description of the effects of inbreeding on the individual
and the institution is a third important aspect.

A policy on in-

breeding which is fair both to the institution and the individuals
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involved can only be the result of an understanding of the real
effects of the phenomenon.

To evaluate the fairness of an institu

tional policy or practice requires a knowledge of both the relation
ship between inbreeding and productivity and the stability of that
relationship across various groups of faculty and through time.
From Eliot's assessment in his 1908 University Administration,
academic inbreeding has received intermittent treatment in the
literature on higher education.

Many early studies were limited in

scope to a single institution or a small sample of institutions.
For example, F. W. Reeves examined inbreeding in his study of
faculty at the University of Chicago in 1933 and J. H. McNeely
studied faculty inbreeding in land-grant colleges and universities
(United States Office of Education [USOE], 1932).
In the early 1930s, Walter Crosby Eells and Austin Carl
Cleveland (1935a, 1935b) undertook a study of the extent, types,
trends, and effects of inbreeding in a national sample of American
colleges and universities.

Their sample included "all the institu

tions of higher education on the accredited list of the American
Council on Education whose catalogues were available in the library
of Stanford University in 1932 and which contained the necessary
academic biographies of faculty members [1935a, p. 261]."

The sam

ple included 219 institutions in 42 states.
Eells and Cleveland (1935a) adopted a comprehensive definition
of inbreeding:
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An individual is considered inbred who is a teaching
member of the faculty and who has received one or more
of his earned degrees from the institution in which
he is giving instruction [p. 262].
The use of any degree as a basis for the inbreeding classification
expanded the inbred group beyond that usually considered in more
recent studies, so that Eells and Cleveland's (1935a) overall
results are not directly comparable to later findings.

It is

possible, however, to use :data they present on the patterns of
inbreeding according to degree (p. 267) to derive an estimate of
terminal degree inbreeding by aggregating all categories which
include doctoral inbreeding.

The results of this recomputation are

shown in Table 1.

Insert Table 1 about here

As Eells and Cleveland (1935a) included instructors in their
sample, those still working on their degree were included.

No

distinction was made between tenure-track and temporary positions:
16.1% of the total sample was inbred at the doctoral level.

Not

only is this figure comparable to later results., it is also useful
in assessing the extent of inbreeding.

As Eells and Cleveland

noted, the total impact of inbreeding was important: "While many
individual cases may be entirely justifiable, in the long run the
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Table 1
Recomputation of Percentage of Inbred Faculty
on Eells and Cleveland Data

Total
Patterns of Inbreeding

n=3903
(%)

Public
n=1819
(%)

Private
n=2084
(%)

Bachelor— Master inbreeding—
Doctorate inbreeding

4.1

2.4

5.6

Bachelor inbreeding— Master
inbred— Doctorate inbreeding

3.8

3.2

4.4

Bachelor— Master— Doctorate
inbreeding

3.7

1.8

5.3

Bachelor— No Master— Doctorate
inbreeding

2.3

.5

3.9

Bachelor inbreeding— No Master—
Doctorate inbreeding

1.4

.2

2.5

No Bachelor— No Master— Doctorate
inbreeding

.4

.1

.6

Bachelor inbreeding— Master—
Doctorate inbreeding

.2

.1

.3

No Bachelor— Master— Doctorate
inbreeding

.1

.1

No Bachelor— Master— Doctorate
inbreeding*

.1

.1

TOTAL

16.1

8.3

22.8

*From the format of the original table it appears that this line
should read "No Bachelor— Master inbreeding— Doctorate inbreeding,"
and thus it is not a duplicate of the line above.
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effect of such inbreeding is likely to be distinctly narrowing
[p. 266]."

The authors were justifiably concerned about the effects

of inbreeding as their analysis using the "any degree" definition
showed that 34% of the total sample was inbred.
On the topic of why institutions practice inbreeding, Eells
and Cleveland (1935a) offered a precursor of later work.

"Institu

tions also are inclined to utilize their own graduates in the lower
academic ranks, in some cases, as a measure of economy [p. 265]."
On the individual's side, the authors observed that graduates may
seek employment at their own institutions while searching for em
ployment elsewhere or while working on their doctorates.
In their second article, Eells and Cleveland (1935b) examined
the effect of inbreeding on rate of advancement, scholarly produc
tivity, and professional recognition.

Each of the 5,707 inbred

subjects in the study was matched with a noninbred faculty member.
The matching was based on several characteristics: institutional
membership, length of service, discipline, sex, and rank.

With

respect to rate of advancement, Eells and Cleveland found that the
mean years for advancement to the next higher rank was greater for
inbred groups hired at the instructor (4.3 years vice 3.2 years for
noninbreds) and assistant professor (4.9 years vice 4.5 years for
noninbreds) levels.

For those hired as associate professors, the

mean years in rank were virtually the same (4.9 for inbred and 5.0
for noninbred).

It should be noted that Eells and Cleveland do not
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segregate instructors hired while still completing degree require
ments.

Thus, it is possible that the large discrepancy in mean

time to promotion from the instructor level is determined at least
in part by the tendency to hire an institution's own students be
fore they receive their degrees.
Eells and Cleveland (1935b) measured scholarly productivity
by the number of books published and by the total number of publi
cations.

Data was obtained for a paired sample by searching the

United States Catalogue. Of the inbred group, 15.8% had published
at least one book while 21% of the noninbred group were authors.
While 322 inbred authors produced 864 books (2.68 books per author),
428 noninbred authors write 1,122 (2.64 books per author).

Based

on the lower percentage of inbred authors and the fewer total books
produced by them, Eells and Cleveland concluded that there "is a
distinct evidence in favor of the noninbred group [p. 326]."

They

do not seem to consider that on the average, noninbred authors were
no more productive than inbred ones and that the option to publish
may or may not have been equally available across the whole sample.
For example, inbreds hired as instructors who have not finished
their degree, are unlikely to publish while noninbreds hired with
terminal degrees may be more likely to publish.

Although Eells and

Cleveland believed this evidence favored noninbreds, it may in fact
only have reflected the conditions under which they were hired.
To assess a broader measure of scholarly productivity, Eells
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and Cleveland (1935b) studied all publications for 992 subjects at
4 institutions.

Data collected from "official reports of faculty

publications" revealed that 227 inbred authors produced an average
of 6.03 titles per author and 231 noninbred authors produced 6.72
titles per author.

Although Eells and Cleveland concluded that

these results "are unfavorable to the inbred group [p. 327]," the
significance of the difference is questionable, especially in light
of the fact that "less than half of the faculty in either group
published anything during the three-year period under consideration
[p. 328]."
As a measure of professional recognition, Eells and Cleveland
(1935b) used the percentage of inbred and noninbred subjects which
were included in each of three national reference works.

The data

for Who's Who in America was characteristic of that for all three
works: 7.1% of the inbred subjects were included, while 10.5% of
the noninbreds were included.

Across all three works, the nonin

bred subjects were more likely to be mentioned.
Eells and Cleveland (1935b) reviewed the work in their two
articles with a clear condemnation of the effects on individuals
of institutional inbreeding.
From every standpoint from which objective evidence has
been collected it appears that the probability of academic
advancement, scholarly productivity, and outside profes
sional recognition are distinctly greater for men who
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have had their academic preparation in institutions
other than those in which they are teaching [p. 328].
In 1938, A. B. Hollingshead published an article on the
relation between ingroup membership and academic selection at
Indiana University.

One of his three criteria for ingroup member

ship was "academic training leading to the successful completion
of one of more degrees at Indiana University [p.826]."

Hollings

head studied 802 regular appointments made from 1885 to 1937.

He

found such a "prevalence of alumni in administrative office" that
he concluded "that the destiny of the university . . . had been
centered in the hands of alumni [p. 827]."

Other results were the

identification of an inverse relation between academic rank and
alumni appointments and the discovery that more than one half of
the instructors were inbred.

Hollingshead cited three reasons for

the high rate of selection from within:
First, the administrators were usually egocentric,
prizing their own viewpoints above all others; second,
they are personally familiar with the [inbred] men
and know whether they are "sympathetic" and "reasona
ble"; third, it is easier to engage a person who is
on the ground or readily contacted than to spend time,
money, and energy looking for outside personnel.

Pride

in your institution, familiarity with the men you have
trained, and their more general docility, are apparently
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some of the factors that tend to "Inbreeding
[p. 832]."
McGee (I960 ) argued that inbreeding, although "deplored,"
was practical as a "functional necessity" to allow an institution
to compete in the national labor market even though "it is handi
capped by location and inadequate finances [p. 483]."

In order

to attract well-known scholars to a relatively isloated location,
the institution must pay them a premium.

Given this burden on

the finite operating budget, however,: the university must find
other faculty willing to work at a discount.

McGee argued that it

is the inbred faculty who were "robbed" in order to attract gradu
ates from other major universities.
inbred

By discriminating against the

faculty on those variables over which the university has

control, the efforts of and rewards to inbred faculty were manipu
lated to allow a surplus of rewards and a decrease in work load
for noninbred faculty.
Using the faculty of the University of Texas as a single case
study, McGee (1960 ) examined 9 job factors across inbred and non
inbred faculty.

He defined inbred faculty as those which received

their highest degree from the University of Texas.

Of the 9 job

factors, 4 were classified as "Category I: Totally Controlled by
the University": present rank, rank at first appointment, years
served in junior rank, and annual class load.

Professional pro

ductivity and possession of research grants were included in
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"Category II: Partially Controlled by University."

The last

three job factors: membership in learned societies, office in
learned societies, and listing in national reference works, com
prised the third category, "Not Controlled by University."

McGee

compared the inbred and noninbred groups by defining two levels
of performance for each job factor (e.g., "1-6" and "7 and over"
for annual class load) and by
and noninbreds

determining the

percentageofinbreds

which fit each of the levels. The percentages were

then compared by a Chi-square test.
In Category I, all the observed differences were statistically
significant at the .05 (or higher) level.

As McGee (1960 ) ob

served, an inbred faculty member
is less likely to be an assistant professor at the
present time, is much less likely to have received
his first

appointment at that rank even if he now

holds it,

is more likely to serve longer

in the

junior ranks before promotion or departure and is
more likely to have a higher teaching load [p. 486].
Noninbred faculty were more likely to be classed as produc
tive

<

.05), where productivity was defined as "any publication

or presentation directed to a professional audience, and including
pieces of individual creativity in the graphic arts as well as
literary, musical, and dramatic works [p. 487]."

Of the inbred

faculty, 53% were classed as productive while 70% of the noninbred
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faculty had achieved the same status.

The other partially con

trolled variable, possession of research grants, required some
modification.

In a later reference to this article, McGee (1961)

admitted that the data was "flatly incorrect in the original table
[p. 58]."

It is possible to reconstruct what should have appeared

in the original table from the data presented in different form
in the second article.

The corrected results for possession of

research grants are shown in Table 2.

The analysis of McGee's

corrected data presented in this table shows that inbred faculty

Insert Table 2 about here

were significantly less likely to have received grant support.
Results for 2 of the 3 "Not Controlled by University" vari
ables, membership in learned societies and listing in national
reference works, were not statistically significant at the .05
level.

Only the "office in learned societies" variable showed

significant results.

Inbred faculty were more likely to have held

an office (j) _< .01) .
McGee (1960 .) also presented data on production of books,
articles, reviews and other publications by University of Texas
graduates, graduates of other major institutions, and graduates of
minor institutions.

Here again the data was presented as percen

tages of the inbred or outbred groups which have published at

Table 2

Reconstruction of McGee's (1961) Results
on Possession of Research Grants

Source of highest academic
_________ degree________
Texas

Other
Institution

Chi
Square

Possession of research grants
Grants

38

153

No grants

66

90

104

243

TOTAL

20.55
p < .01

Note. From "Texas Institutional Inbreeding Re-examined" by
Reece McGee, American Journal of Sociology, 196J-, 67, 58-60.
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least one item in the category in question.

McGee concluded that

his data showed that in every case but that of reviews, Universi
ty of Texas Ph.D.s had produced more scholarly works than men with
doctoral degrees from other institutions (p. 488).

Actually, the

data he presented does not support the contention about the aggre
gate number of scholarly works, however, it did indicate that for
every category except the review, inbred faculty were more likely
to have published at least one example.
McGee's (1960 ) hypothesis was that "the University of Texas,
in order to compete to the maximum possible degree in the academic
labor market of the other major universities, has appointed large
numbers of its own graduates to the junior faculty [p. 486]."

He

believed that his results showed that there was discrimination
against inbred faculty and that "there was no reason to believe
that the differential treatment of the inbred product is the result
of inferior quality on his part Ip. 488]."

However, he also thought

that the results were not the result of a conscious plan.
All this is not to suggest that the administrators of
the university have together compounded a policy for
inbreeding; rather it seems more likely that the uni
versity's handicaps in the academic labor market have
caused numerous deans and department chairmen and mem
bers of promotion committees individually to decide to
rob Peter to pay Paul in specific cases and have created,
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thus, an unconsciously developed administrative adjusment resulting in selective, discriminatory inbreeding
[p. 488].
Gold and Lieberson (1961) use the analysis in McGee's (1960 )
study to demonstrate the need for multivariate analysis "when the
investigator is interested in describing a phenomenon of some com
plexity, not observed directly but inferred from the observation
of associations taken to be consequences of the phenomenon
[p. 506]."

As an example, the authors cite the analysis of rank:

McGee observes directly that a greater proportion of
noninbred than of inbred junior members of the faculty
are assistant professors.

This association between

source of highest degree (major academic training)
and rank exists at the University of Texas; the ob
served association cannot be questioned as a descrip
tion . . . [But] the inference of discrimination must
imply that other variables cannot explain or change
the nature of the association [p. 507].
By enlarging McGee's (1960 ) analysis of rank to include possession
of a doctorate, Gold and Lieberson deduced that the proportion of
non-Ph.D.s was considerably larger among the inbred assistant pro
fessors.

They concluded that "the data clearly suggests a bias in

favor of local products {p. 508]."
Gold and Lieberson (1961) also combined productivity, posses-

36

sion of a doctorate, rank, and source of degree in a secondary
analysis which showed that "33% of the Texans (those with Ph.D.s
from Texas) with some claim to higher rank must be instructors
[p. 508]," while 37% of the non-Texans fell in the same category.
The proportions of both groups which did not meet one or both of
the criteria, but had been promoted to assistant professor are
virtually the same (23% for Texans, 24% for non-Texans).
Gold and Lieberson's (1961) secondary analysis did cast uncer
tainty on the original conclusions, but McGee (I960 ) replied with
a further analysis of the original data which added degree to
source of highest degree and job factor.

Of the variables con

trolled by the university, inbred faculty were favored only among
Ph.D. holders with respect to present rank.

Inbred and outbred,

non-Ph.D. faculty had the same class loads.

For all other job

factor and degree combinations, the outsiders were favored.

Again,

all the statistics were in percentages and no tests of significance
were made.

On 8 of the remaining 10 job factor-degree combinations,

Texans were more productive.

Outsiders had a higher percentage of

productive people only in professional productivity by non-Ph.D.
holders.

McGee concluded that "even when the doctorate is con

sidered, the inbred are still discriminated against despite some
evidence that they may be of higher quality than 'outsiders1
[p. 58]."
The final conclusions to be drawn from the primary and secon-
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dary analyses of the McGee (1960 ) data are not clear.

Gold and

Lieberson (1961) were correct in their statement that the analysis
must take into account significant competing hypotheses and vari
ables, yet McGee's findings are suggestive.

It is also important

to note that all of the work was based on arbitrary determinations
of categories for each variable.

None of the analyses used a con

tinuous scale for professional activity, productivity, class load,
or offices in learned societies.

All of the analyses were depen

dent on the arbitrary cutoff points chosen to dichotomize vari
ables which would be better treated as continuous scales.

Because

the data was from only one university, which McGee admits is dif
ferent in significant ways from other major universities, the ex
ternal validity of any results must be seriously questioned.
Hargens and Farr (1973) used data collected by Warren 0.
Hagstrom in 1966 to examine inbreeding.

Educational, occupational,

and citation histories were collected for 1,514 graduate faculty
members in the fields of mathematics, experimental biology, physics,
and chemistry.

Hargens and Farr examined two questions:

First . . . the relationships between academic inbreeding
and measures of scholarly performance after controlling
for other variables such as the prestige of a scientist's
present departmental affiliation.

Second . . . the inde

pendent relationship between academic inbreeding and a
measure of institutional reward, the number of years
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which elapsed between a scientist's appointment to his
first position and his first subsequent promotion {p. 1387J.
Although Hargens and Farr found a negative relationship between
inbreeding and both number of articles published and number of
citations to previously published works, the coefficients were not
large enough to be significant.
is "no evidence . . .

The authors concluded that there

to suggest that academic inbreeding has any

particular independent relationahip with scientific productivity
when departmental prestige and year of Ph.D. are included in the
analysis {p. 1389]."
Hargens and Farr (1973) continued their analysis by examining
the effect of inbreeding on quantity of publications and citations
for scientists in their first position at "distinguished" depart
ments and for scientists in their second and succeeding appoint
ments across all institutions and for distinguished departments
only.

Hargens and Farr concluded that
When we control

for professional experience, scientists

with positions at their doctoral departments tend to be
slightly less productive, in terms of quantity and quality
of publications, than their noninbred colleagues.

Although

these differences are fairly small and most often statis
tically insignificant, it is notable that every one of the
12 regression coefficients indicating a comparison of
inbreed with non-inbred scientists shows a negative sign.
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On the basis of this evidence it is not unreasonable to
suggest that a slight negative relationship between inbreeding and professional output does exist, but that the
relationship, independent of other variables, is so small
that in a given instance only very large samples enable us
to reject the null hypothesis that its manifestation in
that instance is attributable to sampling error [p. 1393].
Most existing studies of inbreeding suffer from one or both
of two significant weaknesses.

Many studies have sampling restric

tions based on institution or discipline with a consequent con
striction of generalizability. There is also, as Gold and Lieber
son (1961) noted, a need for the use of multivariate analyses to
limit the number of untested competing hypotheses.

The examination

of inbreeding as a basis for discrimination must use a data base
of sufficient size and diversity to allow generalization and the
most sophisticated techniques of analysis the data will support.
In summary, the research on inbreeding is unified only in its
assumption of the undesirability of the phenomenon.

The pessimism

reflected in Eliot's (1908) statement at the turn of the century
prevades the literature.

Although there are some indications in

the research that inbreeding is related to lower productivity, the
range of results and the methodological problems which haunt stud
ies in this area hinder the development of a strong conclusion.
With respect to the research hypotheses stated in Chapter 1, it is
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important to note that none of the research reviewed in this chap
ter includes any consideration of sex.

As it is likely that the

samples studied were primarily or completely male, there is no
basis for inference about the characteristics of female inbred
faculty at colleges and universities.
Productivity
Research Productivity
To evaluate the degree of similarity between two groups or
the possible existence of discrimination between the groups, the
researcher must be able to describe the members of the groups in
terms of characteristics which are relevant to the research ques
tion.

Much of the research using descriptions of the professoriate

has been done by sociologists and economists.

The former often

work on the sociology of science or information dissemination (e.g.,
Cole & Cole, 1967; Crane, 1970; Long, 1978) and the latter most
frequently examine the reward structure in academia (e.g., Hoffman,
1976; Reagan, 1975).
As the studies of inbreeding demonstrate, an important factor
in any economic analysis is productivity.

Statements about the

fairness of selection procedures and rewards must be tempered by
an acknowledgement of the relative productivity of those being com
pared.

Measures of academic productivity are routinely limited to

research results only.

Definitions of productivity in the litera

ture assume a basic, common teaching load that does not vary sig-
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nificantly; as a consequence, research results are considered to
be the only real and variable result of the academic production
function.

The basic measures of productivity used in the litera

ture will be examined in this section.
Perhaps the most frequently used measure of productivity is
the number of journal articles a faculty member has published
(e.g., Cole & Cole, 1967; Crane, 1970; Hagstrom, 1971; Long, 1978).
Theoretically, this measure is favored because of the importance
of journal articles in the information dissemination process and
because of the emphasis on reporting research results.

The latter

emphasis assumes journal articles are a good surrogate for re
search work.

Operationally, the number of journal articles pub

lished is both verifiable and objective.

University publication

lists, abstract services, and bibliographical listings all provide
reasonable sources for measuring the journal article productivity
of a faculty member.

Because the universe of journals can be

defined and because authorship is rarely in question, there is
little argument about the determination of the articles to be
attributed to a particular author.
Although journal articles are the most frequently used measure
of productivity, the number of books and monographs is also used,
sometimes separately and sometimes combined with journal produc
tivity (Katz, 1973; Tuckman, Gapinski, & Hagemann, 1977).

Although

the count of longer publications is as objective and verifiable as
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the number of journal articles, books and monographs require a
different type of effort.

Books often do not stress research

results but are rather a reflection of general scholarly effort.
Fields which emphasize research results rely more heavily on jour
nal articles (e.g., the hard sciences).

Since much of the early

work on academic productivity has been centered on the sciences
(Cole & Cole, 1967; Hagstrom, 1971), book and monograph produc
tion have received little emphasis as productivity variables.

In

nonscientific fields, book publication may in fact have a much
stronger relation to research.
Because of the difference in the type and quantity of work
required to produce articles and books, it would seem best to keep
their numbers separate.

They are not additive without some equiva

lence function and a universal one has not been developed.

For a

discussion of one combination strategy, see Brittingham, Pezzullo,
Ramsay, Long and Ageloff (Pezzullo & Brittingham, 1979, p. 106).
Beyond a reliance on editors and publishers, simple counts
of articles and books can address only the quantity of an author's
work and not the quality.

Several researchers (Chubin, 1973; Cole

& Cole, 1967) have examined the use of citation indices as a mecha
nism for measuring the quality of research.

The results of their

work indicate that citations were related to other measures of
quality.

For example, Cole & Cole (1967) found that the variable

most highly correlated with peer ranking of significant contribu
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tions in psychology was the number of scientific journal citations
to the author's work (p. 379).

In another paper (1972), Cole &

Cole found that Nobel laureates averaged over ten times as many
citations as other scientists.

Chubin (1973) noted that although

"more than half of each cohort published at least one article or
book, . . . only a third garnered one or more citations [p. 188]."
There are several problems with using citations as measures
of academic productivity.

From a procedural standpoint, citation

listings do not cover all academic fields.

Indices for the

sciences are well-designed, while in other fields their develop
ment is more recent or nonexistent.

A potential bias against the

productivity of junior authors is found in the practice of listing
only the first author of co-authored papers.
indications that this bias is not severe.

There are, however,

Chubin (1973) found a

correlation coefficient of .97 between the total citations and
citations to single-authored works of scientists using the Science
Citation Index (p. 189).
Some productivity studies work with data from abstracts or
bibliographical works (Cole & Cole, 1973; Crane, 1970).

An alter

native source is the faculty members themselves (Allison & Stewart,
1974; Astin & Bayer, 1975; Hagstrom, 1971).

However, few studies

use self-report measures because of the relative difficulty in
surveying a significant number of subjects.

Self-report measures

also may be suspect because of possible respondent bias.

However,
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Allison and Stewart (1974) found a correlation of .94 between selfreported number of publications and results from a survey of ab
stracts.

Their results indicate that respondent bias was not a

significant problem in requests for publication data.
Prestige
Although the importance of research productivity in the
description of the academic effort cannot be contested (long, 1979;
p. 147), other factors are also important (Long, 1979; Pezzullo &
Brittingham, 1979).

Complementary to the use of research produc

tivity is the inclusion of prestige, which Caplow and McGee (1958)
describe as "not a direct measure of productivity but a composite
of subjective opinion [p. 110]."

They further explain that it con

sists "in essence, of what other people think about a man [p. 104]."
The clearest, externally-grounded measures of prestige are
departmental affiliations.

It is unclear whether the subjective

opinions of a person held by peers are the result of or the cause
of departmental placements.

Regardless of the direction of causal

ity, the relationship is clear.
Departmental affiliation need not be current; it may be a past
location, a current affiliation, or an expected location.

Long

(1978) used selectivity of a subject’s baccalaureate institution
as a variable in his study of prestige and productivity among
scientists.

He noted that this variable, which "has been interpre

ted . . . as a measure of the quality of baccalaureate education,
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has been shown to be a moderately successful predictor of future
success [p. 893]."

Long also used prestige rankings for the scien

tist's doctoral or postdoctoral institution.

Crane (1970) used

prestige rankings for graduate schools and hiring departments in
a study of the academic marketplace.

She found that "the prestige

of doctorate has more influence than scholarly performance upon
selection for a position in a leading academic department [p. 961]."
Caplow and McGee (1958) lamented the critical nature of the doctoral
department: "Unfortunately, as we have seen, the initial choice of
a graduate school sets an indelible mark on the student's career
[p. 193]."
In the area of prestige accruing from doctoral affiliation,
inbred faculty are in a peculiar position.

Since the prestige of

their doctoral program and of their current department are the
same, it is unlikely that prestige resulting from the doctoral
institution is a critical positive variable in the hiring process
unless the department is unable to attract any candidates from
other departments with equal or higher prestige.
Departmental affiliations need not be for training in order
to confer prestige.

The ranking of the department in which a

faculty member holds a position also influences the subjective
evaluation of that individual's performance.

Caplow and McGee

(1958) discussed the effects of employment prestige and its re
sults:
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The higher the rank of the department

. . . the

more it serves its individual members

by confer

ring a derivative reputation on them.

This repu

tation tends to make them more desirable to other
universities, more independent of their own, and
more inclined to mobility [p. 91].
An important factor in this observation is the linkage between
prestige and mobility.

It would seem that the greater an indi

vidual's prestige, whether derived from identification with his
employing department or from other sources, the greater the indi
vidual's marketability.

The higher an individual's prestige, the

more likely the person has received offers for employment by other
institutions, especially if the individual has make knownawilling
ness to consider other offers.
Prestige can also be measured by honorary degrees, awards,
and memberships or fellowships in honorary societies.

Although

these awards are often viewed as rewards for prior research accom
plishments (Cole & Cole, 1967), they generally confer an increase
in prestige on the recipient.
Other Descriptive Variables
The preceding sections on productivity and prestige measures
reflect the biases of much of the sociological research on faculty.
As the introduction to productivity variables notes, the modal view
of the output of academic work is pecularily limited to published
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scholarly research.

There are also several descriptive variables

of Interest which have not often appeared in sociological studies,
but which are essential for the evaluation of reward systems.
Additional output measures and other individual descriptive vari
ables will be discussed in this section.
The research-based conceptualization of academic productivity
assumes either that all teaching requirements are equivalent and
therefore need not be considered or that teaching is optional and
that professors first allocate whatever time they choose to re
search and all other university obligations compete for whatever
is left. Researchers often choose to ignore or minimize any stated
goal of an institution other than research.

That teaching and ser

vice may also have legitimate cliams to a faculty member's time is
a reality too easily avoided.

However, it need not be.

The quan

titative aspects of teaching demands can be measured by number of
contact hours per week, or perhaps more accurately, by number of
student credit hours (i.e., of credit hours per course x number
of students in class).

If data were available from an acceptable

instrument, teaching expertise could be included as a qualitative
measure of pedagogical efforts (Doyle, 1979; Martin & Williams,
1979).
Service, in the traditional sense of community outreach activi
ties could also be measured in terms of contact hours.

An average

measure over a long period of time would smooth out fluctuations

48

caused by the usually intermittent nature of these activities.
A recent development in the area of outreach by universities is
the expansion of paid consulting services.

In those areas of the

curriculum where academician's skills are in demand in the market
place, income from noninstitutional sources is a surrogate for ser
vice activity.
Administrative activity is also ignored in classical produc
tivity measures.

Efforts in departmental or institutional gover

nance could be measured in terms of the number of administrative
assignments or hours devoted to them.

For example, Tuckman (1979)

asked respondents to identify their major work activity as adminis
tration, teaching or research.

She also asked whether respondents

had any prior administrative experience.
A final omission in the routine operationalization of produc
tivity is "grantsmanship."

For some faculty and institutions, the

ability to capture external support is critical.

Beyond benefits

in terms of release time or support for the individual faculty mem
ber, grants provide much needed financial support for the institu
tion through overhead assessments.

Although the works supported

by the grant may result in publications, and therefore be reflected
in classic productivity measures, the extra effort and benefit from
outside support will not be properly disclosed.

One measure for

"grantsmanship" is the dollars of support received.

An alternative

is the number of proposals authored (Brittingham, Pezzullo, Ramsay,

49

Long & Ageloff, 1979).
Although most sociological studies do not Include much data
about the individual subjects themselves, demographic data is of
ten used in economic studies, especially those on discrimination.
Race, sex, and, more recently, age are most often used to stratify
examples, while discipline and experience are included as indepen
dent variables.
ties.

Only experience presents any measurement difficul

Chronological

age may be used as a surrogate for experi

ence, assuming that the difference between starting times among
individuals is insignificant.

Other researchers (Tuckman, Gapin-

ski & Hagemann, 1977) computed a more exact years of experience
by subtracting the year of Ph.D. receipt from the year of study.
Ramsay (1979) noted that years since terminal degree or age are
correlated, but not perfectly, with experience (p. 41).

The first,

he argued, is a minimum measure as it is likely that an individual's
experience began before the post-doctoral period.
Rewards
Researchers have taken many different views of the rewards to
work as a faculty member.

From sources external from the institu

tion, a faculty member may receive honorary degrees, awards, and
invitations to membership in select societies (Cole & Cole, 1967;
Crane, 1979).

The disciplinary community as a whole also provides

recognition through attention to research, most commonly manifested
in citations.

Cole & Cole (1967) made note of Waterman's view that
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citations operate "as a greater incentive for scientists than more
formal recognition, like prizes and awards [p. 384]."
Although external rewards are by no means trivial, especially
to faculty who prize their mobility, the primary focus of this
research will be on rewards dispensed within the institution.

It

is the university that exercises the decision to hire the inbred
scholar and that is most likely to be sensitive to inbred status.
Within the institution, rewards may come in many forms.

Tri-

vett (1978) found that
Compensation is an inclusive term that could embrace all
forms of economic and noneconomic rewards a person might
receive for higher education.

Psychic gratification from

relatively high social and professional status and the
challenge of teaching are types of compensation for work
in higher education [p. 1],
The report went on to draw on work by Furniss for an enumeration
of examples of compensation
Compensation also includes such benefits as office space,
faculty club memberships, perhaps a parking place, and
particularly for faculty members, the opportunity to earn
additional income by applying knowledge outside the
institution [p. 1].
These noneconomic rewards, especially the last one, are by no
means trivial.

But, due to the difficulty of estimating dollar
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equivalents, the emphasis in this research will be on salaries.
Direct cash payments for services rendered to the university are
the most objective, verifiable measure of reward.
Much has been written on salaries in higher education.

Of

interest to the research questions in this study is the development
of a methodology for identifying wage discrimination.

As a result

of the inclusion of academic employees under the Civil Rights Act
(1964) through the Education Amendments

of 1972, there has been

much concern about the identification, measurement, and abolition
of wage discrimination in higher education.

Nevill (1975) and

Pezzullo and Brittingham (1979) provided a summary of methods to
compare salaries for different groups.

These studies, like most

others on wage discrimination in higher education, focused on the
problem of discrimination against women, but the methodologies dis
cussed could be applied to any affinity group.

Nevill noted that

the traditional procedure is to compute and compare averages for
various groups.

This method ignores any within group variance in

important variables and therefore does not yield results which can
be strictly interpreted as measures of discrimination.

Morse (1979)

demonstrated that the comparison of means may be misleading.

In

his simulation, means for an unbiased school appeared unfair, while
the same data for a biased institution appeared fair.
There are two other methods which allow the variance on a num
ber of significant variables to be included in the computation:
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pairing (also referred to as counterparting) and multiple regres
sion models.

The former requires that each member of the subject

group be paired with a member of the "favored" group who has the
closest similar qualifications.

Ideally, the match in characteris

tics should be so close that any discrepancy in salary could be
attributable to group membership and, therefore, to wage discrimi
nation.

It is, however, very difficult, especially given the many

relevant characteristics and the small size of most faculties, to
accurately match professors with any reliability (Pezzullo &
Brittingham, 1979, p. 4).

Across institutions, paring is almost

impossible to operationalize because of the difficulty of deter
mining the effect of institution on individual salaries.
The most powerful and frequently used technique to identify
wage discrimination is multiple regression analysis.

Whether exami

ning the existence of discrimination (Ramsay, 1979; Scott, 1977;
Tuckman, 1979) or the rewards of faculty skills (e.g., Tuckman,
Gapinski, & Hagemann, 1977), multiple regression analysis is usu
ally the technique of choice because of its capacity to include the
variance from many characteristics through their inclusion as inde
pendent variables.

Katz (1973), Tuckman, Gapinski and Hagemann

(1977), and Tuckman and Tuckman (1976) used multiple regression
analysis to examine the rewards for various faculty skills.

Bayer

and Austin (1975), Hoffman (1976), Johnson and Stafford (1974),
and Scott (1977) used multiple regression analysis to assess the
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existence of wage discrimination in faculty salaries.
To determine discrimination, a regression equation estimating
salary in terms of selected characteristics is developed for the
favored group.

This equation is then used with the characteris

tics of the subject group to develop an estimate of each indi
vidual’s salary as if that person belonged to the favored group.
Assuming the independent variables reflect the basis for legiti
mate salary determination, any discrepancy must be due to group
membership.

A careful explication of this technique is presented

in Ramsay (1979) and Scott (1977).
One difficulty in implementing this methodology is the choice
of predictor variables (Ramsay, 1979; Scott, 1977).

Ramsay cau

tioned against ad hoc modeling with cross-sectional data and de
scribes four possible sources of difficulty: multicollinearity,
proxy variables, specification error, and simultaneous equation
bias.

Scott compared the predictive ability of the several sets

of independent variables shown in Figure 2.

Insert Figure 2 about here

We conclude from the pilot study that there is little
gain in reliability of the estimated salaries of
white males with a large number of predictor variables,

Models

1

2

3

4

5

Year of Birth

X

X

X

X

X

Year of Doctorate

X

X

X

X

X

Number-of Papers

X

X

X

X

Number of Books

X

X

X

X

Date Hired

X

X

X

Number of Ph.D.s

X

X

X

X

X

Variables

Year of Doctorate (squared)
Number of papers (squared)

X

Number of Ph.D.s (squared)

X

Figure 2.

Variables included in Scott’s (n.d.) models

Note. Scott, Elizabeth L. Higher education salary evaluation
(Washington, D.C.: American Association of University Professors).
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and there may even be some loss considering the
additional costs involved in obtaining the
additional data; reliability does not justify re
quiring that many predictor variables be used.
However, it may be that more consistent estimates
of salary inequities are obtained when more pre
dictor variables are used in the salary estimates

[1977, p. 15].
The use of regression analysis to examine salary equity is an
accepted practice.

The modeling process can also be used to test

existing differentials for significance of relationships.

Summary
The literature evaluating the relative merits of inbred faculty
is ambiguous.

Eells and Cleveland (1935a & 1935b) argued that

while the hiring of inbreds may be "distinctly narrowing," it is
often undertaken as a "measure of economy."

Although they con

cluded that noninbreds are more productive, the lack of an exami
nation of confounding factors renders their conclusions suspect.
While Hollingshead (1938) cited pride, familiarity and docil
ity as reasons for inbreeding at Indiana University, McGee (1960 )
argued that inbreeding at the University of Texas was a "func
tional necessity" to allow the University to compete in the labor
market (p. 483).

McGee's analysis of various job factors over

inbred and noninbred faculty indicated that the former do not
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represent "inferior quality {p. 488J."

Gold and Lieberson (1961).

used McGee’s study to demonstrate the need for multivariate analy
sis by adding possession of a doctorate in a secondary analysis.
They concluded that Texas favored inbred faculty.

McGee's (1961 )

reply included source as well as possession of terminal degree.
Based on this second expansion of the original work, McGee again
concluded that inbreds were subject to discrimination.
Hargens and Farr (1973) found inbred scientists to be slightly
less productive than noninbred ones.

The coefficient for inbred

faculty productivity in their results was uniformly negative, but
often insignificant.

The pessimistic ambiguity of the Hargens

and Farr results is characteristic of the research on inbreeding.
The literature is unified only in its assumption of the undesira
bility of the phenomenon.

The studies, often restricted by metho

dological simplicity, do not present a clear statement on either
the relative merits of inbred faculty or on the individual or in
stitutional motivations to practice inbreeding.
The early and still dominant definition of productivity for
faculty is based on research productivity.

The emphasis on publi

cation of journal articles and books, and on citations to previous
works reflects the frequent focus on faculty from scientific dis
ciplines where such data is both available and reliable.

A deriva

tive definition of research productivity can be found in the
opinions of a faculty member's peers (Caplow & McGee, 1958).
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The inclusion of teaching and service as well as research in
the definition of productivity is desirable (Long, 1979).

Adminis

trative activity is also important, especially in the analysis of
salaries as prior or current administrative service was found to
have a positive impact on compensation (Tuckman, 1979).

Measure

ment techniques in these areas are not as well-developed as those
in research productivity.
Rewards to academic productivity may take many forms (Trivett,
1978).

The focus of this research was on institutional salary as

a measure of reward.

The pattern of rewards will be evaluated

through the use of multiple-regression analysis (Ramsay, 1979;
Scott, 1977).
Chapter 2 has surveyed the literature on inbreeding, academic
productivity, and rewards.

Chapter 3 describes the methodology for

a study extending the research on inbreeding to cover differences
between male and female inbred faculty.

The description of the

individual subjects for the determination of the differences was
based on many of the variables described in this chapter.

Multi

ple regression analysis was used to identify and test for discrimi
nation in compensation.

Chapter 3
THE METHODOLOGY
The objective of this study was to build on existing research
by expanding on the studies presented in Chapter 2.

The 1977 sur

vey of the American Professoriate was selected as the data base
because it provided the most recent and comprehensive data on
college and university faculty.

The Survey is described in the

first and second sections of this chapter, with the first section
focused on the sampling procedure and the second section concerned
with the questionnaire.

(The text of individual questionnaire

items is reproduced in Appendix A.)

There are seven statistical

hypotheses, derived from the three research hypotheses presented
in Chapter 1, which are presented and explained in the third sec
tion of the chapter.

Analyses used to test the statistical hypo

theses are described in the fourth section.
The Sample
The data for this research was taken from the 1977 Survey of
the American Professoriate.

This instrument was designed and

implemented under the direction of Everett Carll Ladd, Jr. and
Seymour Martin Lipset and is described in detail in MacDonald
(Note 2).

Questionnaire development and data management were

handled by the staff of the Social Science Data Center of the
University of Connecticut.
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The Survey was chosen as an appropriate sample for this
research because of its breadth.

As noted in Chapter 2, most

studies of inbreeding are limited to a single institution or a
narrow range of disciplines.

The 1977 Survey encompasses 160

institutions and includes faculty from virtually all major academic
disciplines.

The breadth of the data base allows a level of gene

ralization which has not been approached in inbreeding research
since the Eells and Cleveland (1935a, 1935b) studies.
The 1977 Survey is based on a sampling process which began
with the random selection of the institutions within a quota sys
tem based on the classification of the Carnegie Council on Policy
Studies in Higher Education.

Within each chosen institution, a

predefined proportion of full-time faculty were chosen as a pool
for the final sampling process.

These proportions were adjusted

to compensate for the over-sampling from the doctoral-granting
category at the institutional level.

Of the individuals in the

pool, 33.7% were chosen randomly for the core sample.

The develop

ment of the core sample through the sampling scheme is shown in
Table 3.

Insert Table 3 about here

Of the 8,967 questionnaires mailed out, 4,607 were returned.
Of the 4,607 returned 224 were unusable because of irregularities
in the manner in which they were filled out or because the respon-
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Table 3
Sampling Scheme

Tier
level

Carnegie
classification

1 . Doctoral-Granting
Institutions
II.

III.

IV.

V.

Schools
Number P.ercent

Proportions: Core
sample Core
of faculty
sample
chosen
pool

80

50

1/6

13,404

4,512

Comprehensive
Universities and
Colleges

40

25

1/6

2,262

762

Liberal Arts
Colleges I

13

8

1/3

519

175

Liberal Arts
Colleges II

6

4

1/3

139

47

21

13

1/4

898

303

160

100

17,221

5,799

2-Year Colleges
Total

Note. From Technical Report; 1977 Survey of the American Profes
soriate by R. K. MacDonald. Storrs: The University of Connecticut,
Social Sciences Data Center, February, 1978, p. 2.
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dent was ineligible for the study.

MacDonald (Note 2, p. 7) com

puted the "actual, adjusted response rate" as 51.7% (4,383 usable
responsed divided by 8,473).

This is "the proportion of the facul

ty eligible and able to participate in our study who chose to re
turn a completed questionnaire [p. 7]."
Basic demographic data for the distributions of respondents
by sex, rank, and type
Table 4.

of control of institution are presented in

Also included in Table 4 are comparable data drawn from

Insert Table 4 about here

a report developed by the National Center for Education Statistics
(NCES) (1977).

MacDonald (1978) used the NCES population data and

data from earlier Carnegie and ACE (American Council on Education)
surveys to demonstrate that the respondents to the 1977 Survey
were representative of the American professoriate.

As MacDonald

concluded and as indicated by the data in Table 4, the comparisons
show that the Survey is consonant with other population and sample
data and therefore there is reason to have "confidence in the
accuracy of the 1977 Survey as a portrait of the American profes
soriate (p. 19)."
Not all observers share MacDonald's (JL978) confidence.

Seve

ral aspects of the 1977 Survey have been the subject of significant
controversy in the popular press.
on two areas:

Most of the criticism focused

response bias and question ambiguity.

Dalenius
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Table 4
Demographic Distribution of Respondents
(in percent)

1977 Survey

NCESa

Male

81

77

Female

19

23

Professors

32

27

Associate Professors

25

29

Assistant Professors/Instructors

43

44

Public

73

69

Private

27

31

University

42

35

4-Year Institution

40

54

2-Year Institution

19

10

3

National Center for Educational Statistics
Note. From Technical Report: 1977 Survey of American Professoriate
by R. K. MacDonald. Storrs: The University of Connecticut, Social
Science Data Center, February, 1978, p. 23.
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(1979, p. 27) cited the former: "The implementation of the sampling
design can only be characterized as a complete failure: The non
response amounted to roughly 50 percent."

In response to this

criticism, Lipset argued that
the return rate was by no means low for a long
written questionnaire and that in a 1975 survey
500 nonrespondents were asked by telephone three
questions from various sections of the question
naire.

"We found that the response pattern was

almost identical," he said, adding that it was
reasonable to assume that this would also apply
to the 1977 Survey [Fiske, 1979, p. C4].
In addition to the 1975 survey of nonrespondents, two other steps
were taken with respect to the response bias issue.

First, and

of some controversy itself, was the use of a weighting system to
compensate for sampling errors, variations in response rates, and
the intentional oversampling of certain groups.
system is detailed in MacDonald (Note 2).

The weighting

The calculations used

in deriving the weights are presented in Figure 3.

Steps 2 and 3

Insert Figure 3 about here

were performed only on cells which were the subject of initial
oversampling.
The second step taken to deal with the response bias question
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1.

1975 Percentage of Total Cases
1977 Percentage of Total Cases

Number of Core Cases_
Number of Total Cases

=

_ Pnro

AdjustIIient Factor

3.

Core Weight X Adjustment Factor = Preliminary Weight

4.

Preliminary Weight X 2 = 1977 Weight

Figure 3:

Calculations used in deriving weights

Note. From Technical Report: 1977 Survey of the American
Professoriate by R. K. MacDonald. Storrs: The University of
Connecticut, Social Science Data Center, February, 1978, p. 12.
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was the comparison of the weighted results to data from other sour
ces.

A sample of these comparisons is given in Table 4.

With only

minor exceptions, the 1977 Survey results appeared similar to the
other data.

MacDonald (Note 2, p. 21) presents rank, field, and

institution-type data for weighted and unweighted respondents and
for nonrespondents.

Except for the areas of intentional oversamp

ling, the distributions were similar.
The second general area of concern was question ambiguity.
Lang (Fiske, 1979, p. C4) argues that none of the responses to a
request for a measure of agreement with a statement expressing an
opinion about the government were acceptable.

Ambiguity of word

ing criticisms were focused on the opinion items of the Survey.
As this research utilized only questions asking for specific infor
mation (such as, rank and number of publications), the assertion
of question ambiguity did not apply and did not receive further
cons iderat ion.
The question of bias in responses to specific items posed a
more difficult problem for this research.

The most sensitive ques

tions used in the research asked for salary data.

MacDonald (1978,

p. 19) noted that the 1977 Survey salary average was above both
of the results from other studies.

There was, however, no reason

to believe that any group of concern in this research was more
prone to response manipulation than any other group.

Therefore,

for the purposes of testing for relative differences, the data was
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deemed sufficient.
The Questionnaire

The questionnaire was designed by Everett Carll Ladd, Jr. and
Seymour Martin Lipset with the help of the staff of the Social
Science Data Center and several contributors: Robert Merton,
Harriet Zuckerman, David Palmer, Michael O'Leary, Maryse Eymonerie,
Leonard L. Ross, and Alice Rossi (MacDonald, 1978, p. 5).

The

instrument was pretested on a group of 50 of the designers'
colleagues.

These subjects were asked to evaluate the questions,

design, and layout of the questionnaire.
The instrument included 128 questions covering 10 general
areas: current concerns in higher education, the financial state
of higher education, academic standards, faculty organization and
collective representation, academic career data, faculty "renewal,"
national affairs, biographical data, norms of science and scholar
ship, and professional activities in foreign countries.

Although

the research hypotheses discussed in Chapter 1 were not considered
in the design of the questionnaire, the data required to test them
was included in the sections covering academic career, faculty
renewal, and biographical data.

The data available for each of

the categories of variables presented in Chapter 2 will be dis
cussed.

(Copies of the questionnaire items relating to each cate

gory are included in Appendix A.)
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Inbreeding

Comparison of the responses to a request for a list of degrees,
granting institutions, and years of award (Question 32) with insti
tutional identification which was determined in the sample selec
tion process yielded a measure of inbred status.

However, since

the anonymity of the respondents was guaranteed, institutional
affiliations were not released in the data base.

To compensate

for this, Ms. Sally Daniels of the Roper Center constructed six
new variables matching current affiliation with the origin of
\

each degree individually, with the origin of the highest degree
only, and with the origin of any degree.

These six variables

allowed the identification of each subject as inbred or not inbred
according to any single degree the individual holds or according
to any combination of degrees.

When combined with the specifica

tion of the highest degree (Question 32), the new variables allowed
the identification of inbreeding at the terminal degree level.
Throughout this research, subjects are defined as inbred if they
received their highest degree from the institution at which they
are employed.

"Silver cording," the practice of institutions hir

ing their own graduates only after a period of teaching at another
institution, was identified by combining the new variables and the
number of institutional employers (Question 34).
Research Productivity
The data base provided separate variables for the lifetime
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production of journal articles (Question 48), and for the lifetime
production of books and monographs (Question 47).

The recent rate

of productivity was available through the response to separate
requests for the number of books, articles, and other writings pub
lished or accepted in the last two years (Question 49).

In addi

tion to these traditional measures of research productivity, infor
mation on the procurement of research grants was also available.
Respondents were asked if they had ever received funding (Question
50) and if they had received funding in the last 12 months (Ques
tion 51).

They were also asked to categorize the sources of the

funds that were the basis for positive answers to Questions 50 and
51 (Question 52).
Prestige
Unlike reserach productivity, prestige is a construct without
accepted measurement criteria.

As suggested by Caplow and McGee

(1958, p. 91), mobility will be used as a surrogate for prestige.
Respondents were asked whether they had received an offer of
another job or a serious inquiry about availability within the
last 2 years (Question 71).

They were also asked whether they had

sought or made serious inquiry about another position in the last
2 years (Question 72).
In addition to the mobility data cited previously, the questionnarie also asked "Comparing yourself with other academic per
sons of your age and qualifications, how successful do you consider
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yourself in your career?" (Question 79).

Although the question

seems directly aimed at the concept of prestige, the "halo" effect
of self-reporting by an ego-involved subject may yield results
which do not adequately differentiate the various categories of
respondents.

Insufficient dispersion would require the exclusion

of this variable from the analysis.
Other Descriptive Variables
To balance the common emphasis on reserach activities, data
was collected on other descriptive variables.

The 1977 Survey

asked each respondent to specify how many hours per week were
spent on various activities: administration, scheduled teaching,
preparing for teaching, advising and counseling students, and
research and scholarly writing (Questions 41 and 42).

Unlike the

research variables listed previously, the specification of hours
of activity is a description of effort rather than results.
Work as a paid consultant is an increasingly important service
option for many academics.

Data on all consulting work and on

work within the last 2 years was included in the Survey (Questions
53 and 54).

For both time periods, respondents were asked to

specify the source of the consulting engagement (Question 55).
Respondents were not asked to report consulting income, however,
they were asked how much was earned above base salary
45)..

(Question

While this income could come from any source, consulting is

probably the single greatest source of outside revenues for most
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professors.
In addition to the information provided by responses describ
ing allocation of time, important insights into faculty activity
were gained from the respondents' perceptions of their roles.

The

Survey requested that each subject choose the terms which were the
best and poorest descriptors of the subject from a list of five
terms: intellectual, professional, scholar, scientist, and teacher.
The respondents were also asked to evaluate whether their primary
interests lie in research or teaching (Question 57) and whether or
not their work is pure, applied, policy oriented, or literary
(Question 58).

A final question in this area (Question 59) asked

the subjects whether their work is primarily theoretical or pri
marily experimental, if that distinction is relevant to their dis
cipline.
Compensation
Respondents were asked to indicate their gross institutional
salary (Question 43) and to indicate whether the salary is based
on a calendar or an academic year (Question 44).

Responses to the

gross salary question are scaled in uneven dollar increments.

As

noted in the discussion of consulting, the Survey also asked how
much respondents had earned above their basic salary (Question 45).
Demographics
Descriptive data on rank, tenure status, field, and personal
characteristics were included in the Survey.

Respondents were
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asked their present rank (Question 38) and the number of years in
higher education, at their present institution, and in their pres
ent rank (Question 35a, 35b, and 35c).

Included in the responses

to the request for information on the type of current appointment
were separate categories for tenured and untenured positions
(Question 39).

Subjects with tenure were also asked to give the

year in which tenure was awarded (Question 40).
Respondents were asked to give fields of specialty relating
to four career factors: the field in which the postgraduate degree
was taken; the field in which the current appointment was held;
the principle teaching field; and the primary field of research,
scholarship, and creativity (Question 46a, 46b, 46c, and 46d).
In addition to the professional demographics discussed pre
viously, subjects were asked for sex, age, race, and marital sta
tus (Questions 46, 108, 109, 112, and 106).
Statistical Hypotheses
The data derived from the 1977 Survey was used to test the
research hypotheses which were generally stated in Chapter 1.

The

first step in the analytical process was the derivation of more
specific statistical hypotheses and the selection of methods for
testing them.

The hypotheses are described in this section of the

chapter and the procedures guiding the analysis are explained in
the subsequent section.
The first research hypothesis deals with the relationship of
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sex and institutional origin to productivity: Female inbred faculty
have patterns of productivity which are significantly different
from the patterns of productivity of male inbred faculty.

Restated

as a statistical hypothesis this becomes the null listed below:
H^(Null)— there is no difference in productivity between
female and male inbred faculty.
The second research hypothesis relates institutional origin
to professional advancement: Inbred faculty show less professional
advancement than outbred faculty.

Retention, rank, and tenure sta

tus are the significant professional variables in higher education.
Because of the cross-sectional data and the difficulty in opera
tionalizing the dependent variables, some ingenuity was required
to develop statistical hypotheses in this area.
A problem in the specification of the hypotheses on profes
sional advancement is the effect of sex on the dependent variables.
As this research is interested in the differential effect of
institutional origin on females and males, the hypotheses are sep
arately stated for each sex.

The effect of this design is to

determine whether inbred faculty are treated significantly different
from noninbred faculty of the same sex.
The question of retention is a significant one for inbred
faculty.

Bias against the very fact of inbreeding may lead to pre

mature discontinuance which would not be justifiable on other
grounds.

The impact of institutional origin on longevity in the
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first position is considered in statistical hypothesis two:
H2a(Null)— there is no difference in the rate of retention at
the first position between inbred and noninbred male faculty,
H_, (Null)— there is no difference in the rate of retention at
J.D

the first position between inbred and noninbred female faculty.
A critical measure of professional advancement is the years
a faculty member serves before being promoted.

Possibly, one

detrimental effect of inbred status is the requirement of greater
time in a lower rank for promotion.

The third and fourth statis

tical hypotheses examine the timing of promotions:
H^CNull)— there is no differencein years served prior to
promotion to associate professor between inbred and noninbred male
faculty of that rank,
H^(Null)— there is no difference in years served prior to
promotion to associate professor between inbred and noninbred fe
male faculty of that rank,
H^a (Null)— there is no difference in years served prior to
promotion to full professor between inbred and noninbred male
faculty of that rank,
H^(Null)— there is no differencein years served prior to
promotion to full professor between inbred and noninbred female
faculty of that rank.
The achievement of tenure is essential to long-term profes
sional advancement among faculty.

Research on the tenure decision
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process requires information on those denied tenure as well as those
given tenure.

Cross-sectional data from faculty in existing posi

tions is insufficient to model the tenure decision.

However, some

conclusions can be drawn from the existing data.
As hypotheses three and four can test time to promotion only
for those who have been promoted it is possible that a bias against
one group might not be apparent in these tests.

If the bias re

sulted in a person being held at a lower rank, the individual would
never enter the sample for a test of time to promotion.

Hypothesis

five examines the effect of institutional origin and sex on the
very fact of promotion:
H^a(Null)— there is no difference in the distribution of ranks
between inbred and noninbred male faculty.
H^(Null)— there is no difference in the distribution of ranks
between inbred and noninbred female faculty.
Analogous to the number of years served prior to promotion is
the time served before the granting of tenure.

It is possible that

a bias against inbred faculty may result in an increase in the time
required prior to the receipt of tenure.

The sixth hypothesis

examines the relationship between sex, inbred status, and service
prior to the granting of tenure.
Hga (Null)— there is no difference in the years served prior to
the receipt of tenure between inbred and noninbred tenured male faculty,
Hg^(Null)— there is no difference in the years served prior to
the receipt of tenure between inbred and noninbred tenured female faculty.
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In addition to professional advancement, faculty members also
receive compensation as a reward for their efforts.

The third

research hypothesis, relating institutional origin to levels of
compensation, is embodied in the seventh statistical hypothesis:
H^(Null)— there is no difference in institutional rewards
between inbred faculty and outbred faculty.
Analysis
The seven statistical hypotheses in the previous section were
tested using the 1977 Survey data.

Unless otherwise noted, only

faculty with Ph.D., Ed.D. or other non-professional doctorates
were included in the analyses.
Statistical Hypothesis One
The first statistical hypothesis examines the difference be
tween the productivity of male and female inbred faculty.

The

analysis for this hypothesis started with the extraction of the
male and female members of the inbred faculty as subsamples.

Dis

criminant analysis was performed to develop a model for differen
tiating between the two groups using productivity values as predic
tor variables.
When discriminant analysis is used to determine whether there
are significant differences between defined groups, two assumptions
must be met.

The predictor variables must be normally distributed

and have equal dispersion matrices.

The latter need not be known;

it is equality and not magnitude which is assumed.
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The standard test to determine the significance of the dif
ference between two groups in discriminant analysis is the
2

Mahalanobis D . This statistic measures the separation of the
group means along the discriminant axis and is distributed as an
F-statistic in the two-group case (Green & Tull, 1975, p. 458).
Statistical Hypothesis Two
The second statistical hypothesis examines the relationship
between institutional origin and retention.

The latter is speci

fied as retention at the first academic position.

Ideally, this

hypothesis should be tested with longitudinal data following 1 or
more cohorts through the early career years.

As this analysis is

not possible with the 1977 Survey data, a cross-sectional substi
tute was devised.
The sample was divided into cohorts based on the year in which
each subject was awarded a terminal degree and on sex.

The sub

jects in each cohort were identified as inbred or noninbred and as
holding their initial appointment or holding a second or subsequent
appointment.

The significance of the difference in the frequency

of retention between inbreds and noninbreds was tested separately
for each cohort using a Chi-square test.
Not only did this analysis provide information on each cohort's
retention rates, it also allowed observation of changes in the pat
tern of significance over the various year groups.

To the extent

that multiyear, cross-sectional data can be used to generalize
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about individual career progression, the changes in the signifi
cance across cohorts of increasing experience provided information
about retention prospects for early and future cohorts.
Statistical Hypotheses Three and Four
The third and fourth statistical hypotheses examine the timing
of promotion to associate- and full-professor, respectively.

Test

ing these hypotheses began with the selection of 4 subsamples
based on rank and sex at the time of the Survey: 2 for associate
professors, male and female; and 2 for full professors, male and
female.

The former are used to test hypothesis three and the lat

ter, hypothesis four.
As productivity variables have a significant influence on rate
of promotion, the analysis used for the hypotheses controlled for
these effects through the use of analysis of covariance.

The

dependent variable was years served prior to promotion to present
rank; the treatment variable was institutional origin; and, the
covariates were productivity measures.
Statistical Hypothesis Five
Statistical hypothesis five examines the relationship between
institutional origin, sex, and promotion.

A Chi-square test was

used to compare ranks to institutional origin for each of 2 sub
samples based on sex.
Statistical Hypothesis Six
The relation between the time served prior to the granting of
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tenure and institutional origin is the subject of the sixth hypo
thesis.

Subsamples were drawn for female and male tenured faculty.

Combination of information on the year in which subjects

first

taught and the year in which they got tenure allows a determination
of the years served prior to the receipt of tenure.

As years to

tenure may be at least partially based on productivity, analysis
of covariance controlling for productivity measures was used to
test this hypothesis.
Statistical Hypothesis Seven
The seventh statistical hypothesis examines the relationship
between institutional rewards and origin.
for the analysis is salary.

The dependent variable

As outlined in Chapter 2, the metho

dology for testing this hypothesis was developed to identify dis
crimination usually due to race or sex.

In this analysis noninbred

faculty were considered the favored group.
The basic identification methodology started with the develop
ment of a regression model explaining the salary of noninbred
faculty in terms of predictor variables including several demo
graphic characteristics, research productivity, prestige, and other
descriptive variables.
given in Chapter 4.)

(The exact specifications of the model are
The next step in the analysis was to substi

tute the independent values for each inbred subject into the
regression equation to obtain individual predicted salaries for the
inbred group.

These predicted salaries reflect the level of com-
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pensation an inbred faculty member would have received if he or
she had been compensated on the same basis as a noninbred person.
Previous work (surveyed in Chapter 2) on the use of regression
analysis in salary inequity proceeds from the determination of pre
dicted salaries for the unfavored group by inspection.

As the

methodology was designed to support decision-making about salary
adjustments in individual cases, no hypothesis testing extension
had been developed.

For the purposes of this research, it was

necessary to test the significance of the differences between the
predicted and actual salaries of the inbred subjects.

This was

done by performing a t-test on the predicted and actual salaries.
Summary
The research strategy presented in this chapter was directed
at gaining generalizability through breadth using the most compre
hensive data base available.

The 1977 Survey of the American

Professoriate was designed and implemented under the direction of
Everett Car11 Ladd, Jr. and Seymour Martin Lipset.

It included 128

questions covering a broad range of academic concerns and was sent
to 8,967 faculty members.

Of the 4,607 returned, 4,383 usable

responses were obtained.
Data for the items which described the various categories cited
in Chapter 2 (research productivity, prestige, other descriptive
variables, compensation, and demographics) were used in this analy
sis.

Several "custom" variables were added to the basic data base
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to allow the identification of inbred faculty without compromising
any respondent's annonymity.
There were six statistical hypotheses derived from the three
research hypotheses listed in Chapter 1.

The translation of the

first hypothesis, relating sex of inbred faculty to productivity,
and the third hypothesis relating institutional origin to compen
sation, were straightforward.
Operationalizing the second hypothesis was more problematical
because of the lack of longitudinal data and difficulty in speci
fying the dependent variables.

The result was four hypotheses

which examine the relationship of institutional origin to retention
rates, years served prior to promotion, and contract status.
Determination and evaluation of salary differences required
the addition of an hypothesis test to the accepted identification
mode.

Testing the statistical hypotheses involved discriminant

analysis, Chi-square tests, analysis of covariance, and regression
analysis leading to a J^-test.
presented in the next chapter.

The results of these analyses are

Chapter 4
THE RESULTS
The findings of the analyses proposed in the description of
the methodology are reported in this chapter.

After an initial

section that provides some comparative descriptive statistics, the
results of each of the statistical hypotheses are presented.

The

chapter concludes with a discussion of the findings.
Inbreeding Past and Present
One benefit of the research on inbreeding is the availability
of statistical results from early studies for comparison with cur
rent findings.

Before starting the specific tests described in

Chapter Three, two kinds of descriptive statistics were run to
obtain a better understanding of the composition of the sample and
to provide results which could be compared to previous studies.
The computations for the percentage of inbred faculty with
terminal degrees based on the Eells and Cleveland (1935a) data
were presented in Chapter Two.

Results for the 1935 data and com

parable findings from the 1977 Survey are presented in Table 5.
The rate of inbreeding for holders of the doctoral degree has
dropped from sixteen percent to eleven percent.

Insert Table 5
Eells and Cleveland (1935a) also presented figures for the
percentage of inbreeding in several academic disciplines.
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Corre-
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TABLE 5

Percent of Total Faculty Inbred(Doctorate)___________

1977 Survey

11.0

1935 Eells and Cleveland Study

16.1
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sponding calculations were run on the 1977 Survey data.

The re

sults presented in Table 6 use the category names from the Eells
Insert Table 6
and Cleveland survey.

One of the fields posed significant prob

lems when the attempt was made to match it with the current data.
The 1977 survey contained no separate category for ancient langu
ages, hence the comparison of the earlier modern languages figure
with the current foreign languages category is misleading and is
omitted from the table.

With the exception of the field of home

economics, the percentages of inbred faculty have declined.
Statistical Hypothesis One
The first statistical hypothesis addressed the productivity
differences between inbred men and women:
(Null) —

there is no difference in productivity between

female and male inbred faculty.
The test of this hypothesis was based on discriminant analysis
using the sex of the inbred faculty members to determine group
membership.

Only those subjects with academic doctorates (Ph.D.,

Ed.D., or other doctorates except first professional degrees) were
chosen for the analysis.

The data included 284 men and 50 women

with doctorates granted by the institution at which they are cur
rently faculty members.

The actual number of subjects included

in each of the analyses varied slightly due to the treatment of
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TABLE 6

Percent of Inbred Faculty by Field

Field

Eells & Cleveland
1935

1977
Survey

Biological Science

40

14

Chemistry

37

6

Education

34

12

Physical Education

34

5

Mathematics

33

7

English

32

5

History

31

11

Physical Sciences

28

10

Social Sciences

27

6

Home Economics

22

22
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missing data.

Before the discriminant analyses were run, two pre

liminary steps were taken.

An analysis was run to examine the dis

tribution of subjects by academic specialty and several new vari
ables were developed from items in the 1977 Survey.

The analysis

and the items are described in the next part of this section, prior
to the discussion of the discriminant analysis.
As the norms for many of the productivity measures vary by
fields, a preliminary Chi-square was performed to determine whether
the distribution of the inbred faculty across fields varied accord
ing to sex.

The test did not reject the null hypothesis that the

distributions are drawn from the same population.

The results of

the test are shown in Table 7.

Insert Table 7

A concern about the comparability of measures of research
productivity led to the creation of several new variables from
items existing in the data base.

To control for varying lengths

of time served as a faculty member, the two variables for total
article and total book production were divided by the number of
years of experience since the granting of the most recent degree.
The new variables, designated ARATE for articles and BRATE for
books, reflect the rate of production per year of experience and
can therefore be compared across subjects with different lengths
of experience.
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TABLE 7
Chi-Square Analysis of Field by Sex for Inbred Faculty

Fielda
Social
Sciences

Humanities/
Fine Arts

Natural
Sciences

Applied
Professional
Fields

Sex

Males

51

26

82

116

Females

12

7

11

17

ax2(3) = 3-083» P = *379
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A second concern about the comparability of measures of re
search productivity is derived from data describing how the sub
jects allocate their time.

An individual in a job situation which

requires heavy non-research efforts cannot be fairly compared to
an individual who is free to devote a large quantity of time to
research.

To control for the amount of effort devoted to research,

ARATE and BRATE were divided by a measure of the number of hours
devoted to research.

The resulting variables, AREF and BREF, mea

sure the rate of productivity per year of experience adjusted for
the amount of time available (for articles and books, respectively.)
To guard against the homogenizing effect of the ARATE and
BRATE computations, which would portray a person who had a prolific
early career and no recent publications in the same way as a stea
dily producing person if the data were comparable, the number of
books, articles, and other writings produced in the last two years
was included.

These variables were also adjusted for the amount

of time devoted to research, resulting in new variables for twoyear production of books (B2EF), articles (A2EF), and other writ
ings (02EF).
The basic technique used to evaluate the data for statistical
hypothesis one was discriminant analysis.

A stepwise procedure

utilizing the smallest Wilks' Lambda as the criterion for variables
selection was used.

A complete description of the technique can

be found in Nie, Hull, Jenkins, Steinbrenner, and Bent (1975).
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Minor modifications of the procedure related to the 8.0 version of
the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences are explained in
Hull and Nie (1979).

The test for the equality of the group cen

troids was an F ratio based on the Mahalonobis distance between
the groups (Nie, et alia, 1975, p. 460).
Because of the broad range of productivity variables, several
analyses were run.

The first used all variables; the others uti

lized only one type of productivity measures: separate analyses
were run for output (using each of 2 different definitions of
research output) and for effort.

The variables included in each

of the analyses are presented in Figure 1.

Insert Figure 4
Analysis One
The first analysis included all the available productivity
variables except those which were made redundant by the inclusion
of the created variables reflecting effort in the measurement of
research productivity (AREF, BREF, A2EF, B2EF, 02EF). The results
of the discriminant analysis are presented in Table 8.

Standar-

Insert Table 8
dized discriminant function coefficients are shown for each of
the 11 variables chosen by the Wilks criterion.

The F-test for

the significance of the Mahalonobis distance between groups was
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Variable
Weekly hours of administration
Weekly hours of teaching
Weekly hours of preparation
Weekly hours of counseling
Weekly hours of formal instruction
Above salary earnings
Number of books published (last 2 years)
Number of articles published (last 2 years)
Other writings published (last 2 years)
Receipt of research funding (ever)
Receipt of research funding (last year)
Service as paid consultant (ever)
Service as paid consultant (last 2 years)
Primary interest: Teaching/Research
Research: Pure or Basic
Research: Applied
Research: Policy oriented
Research: Literary or expressive
Research: Theoretical or experimental
Articles: Rate of production (ARATE)
Books: Rate of production (BRATE)
Articles: Rate of productivity adjusted
by effort (AREF)
Books: Rate of productivity adjusted
by effort (BREF)
Articles: Last 2 years' productivity
adjusted by effort (A2EF)
Books: Last 2 years's productivity
adjusted by effort (B2EF)
Other Writings: Last 2 years' productivity
adjusted by effort (02EF)

Figure 4: Variables Used in the Analyses

1

Analyses
2a
2b

X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

3

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
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TABLE 8

Results of Discriminant Analysis of All Productivity Variables

Variables in the Final
g
Discriminant Function

Research funding in last 12 months

Standardized Discriminant
Function Coefficients

-.55

Percentage of above salary earnings

.49

Books: 2 year productivity adjusted
for effort

.66

Books: rate of productivity adjusted
for effort

-.81

Articles: rate of productivity
adjusted for effort

.53

Service as a paid consultant
in the last two years

.34

Research described as "applied"

-.36

Articles: 2 year productivity
adjusted for effort

-.47

Research described as "policyoriented"

.25

Weekly hours of formal instruction

.27

Weekly hours of administration

.24

aF value = 4.01, p = .000
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significant at the .001 level.

The null hypotheiss of no diffe

rence between groups was rejected.
Analysis Two
The second analysis was designed to test for differences on
output variables defined as standard research measures and indica
tions of service as a consultant and of receipt of research funding.
The analysis was run twice: the first run (2a) included research
measures adjusted for both experience and effort; the second (2b)
included an adjustment only for experience.
Table 9 shows the results of both the 2a and 2b analyses.

Six

Insert Table 9

variables entered the first of the discriminant functions and 2
entered the second.
at the .001 level.

Both F-tests were statistically significant
The hypothesis that the group centroids for

output measures were equal was rejected.
Analysis Three
The third analysis included only variables reflecting the
subjects distribution of effort.

Weekly hours of administration,

teaching, preparation, counseling, and formal instruction were
combined with percentage of above salary earnings. The former are
direct measures of input while the latter is a surrogate for hours
spent outside the institution.
The results of the third analysis are shown in Table 10.

Two
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TABLE 9

Results of Analyses Using Output Variables

Variables in the Final
Discriminant Function

Standardized Discriminant
Function Coefficients

Analysis 2a: Adjusted for Experience and Effort

Research funding in the last
year
Books: 2 year productivity
adjusted for effort

3.

.58

-.69

Books: Rate of productivity
adjusted for effort

.84

Articles: 2 year productivity
adjusted for effort

.75

Articles: Rate of productivity
adjusted for effort

-.52

Other writings: 2 year pro
ductivity adjusted for effort

-.43

Analysis 2b: Adjusted for experience*5

Research funding in the last
year

.91

Books: Overall productivity
adjusted for experience

.34

aF yalue = 4.28, p = .0004
**F value = 6.67, p = .001
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Insert Table 10
variables, above salary earnings and weekly hours of teaching,
entered the equation.

The distance between the groups was signifi

cant at the .01 level leading to the rejection of the null hypo
thesis that there was no difference between the groups on effort
measures.
Statistical Hypothesis Two
The impact of institutional origin on longevity is considered
separately for males and females in statistical hypotheses 2a and
2b:
H„

—

there is no difference in the rate of retention at the

la

first position between inbred and noninbred male faculty,
H_, —

there is no difference in the rate of retention at the

lb

first position between inbred and noninbred female faculty.
These (and all other) hypotheses were tested only on faculty with
academic doctorates holding positions at research or doctoral
granting universities.

This group was divided into cohorts based

on the year in which the doctorate was received.
was tested separately for each of the cohorts.

Each hypothesis
As it is unlikely

that there would be a significant change in the patterns of reten
tion beyond the tenth year, the analyses were run only for those
receiving doctorates after 1967.
Chi-square tests were run to determine the significance of
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TABLE 10
Results of Analysis Using Effort Variables

Variables in the Final
Discriminant Function

Above Salary Earnings
Weekly Hours of Teaching

aF value = 4.70, p = .009

Standardized Discriminant
Function Coefficients

.98
-.35
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the relation between institutional origin and rate of retention.
For cohorts with less than 21 cases, Fisher's exact test was used;
for larger cohorts, Yates' corrected Chi-square was used.

The

results of the analysis for males are shown in Table 11 and for
females in Table 12.

Insert Tables 11 and 12

As the Tables show, only two of the twenty tests were signifi
cant at the p < .05 level.

There is no reason to reject the null

hypotheses, which posit no relationship between the two factors.
The number of inbred and noninbred subjects for each cohort is
listed with the percentage of each group still in the first posi
tion.
The small number of inbred faculty in many of the cohorts
makes the results involving these cells suspect. Generalizations
which depend on small numbers of subjects are tenuous at best.

To

alleviate the problem of small cell n's, the Chi-square analyses
were run again, separately for males and females, for all subjects
in any of the ten cohorts.

[Results of these analyses are shown

in Table 13 for males and Table 14 for females.]

Insert Tables 13 and 14

The Chi-square results are significant at the p < .05 level
for both the female and male faculty, indicating a rejection of
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TABLE 11

PERCENTAGE OF INBRED AND NONINBRED FACULTY
HOLDING FIRST ACADEMIC POSITION BY YEAR OF DOCTORATE FOR MALES

NONINBRED

INBRED
Year
Doctorate
Conferred

Percent at 1st Position

Total
Total
n
n
Percent at 1st Position

1977

75.0

4

76.9

13

1976

75.0

4

61.5

39

1975

77.8

9

74.5

47

1974

80.0

10

59.5

84

1973

75.0

12

53.8

93

1972*

91.7

12

48.6

107

1971*

100.0

7

50.0

92

1970

75.0

16

54.5

110

1969

83.3

12

53.9

89

1968

76.9

13

45.5

99

* p < .05
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TABLE 12

PERCENTAGE OF INBRED AND NONINBRED FACULTY
HOLDING FIRST ACADEMIC POSITION BY YEAR OF DOCTORATE FOR FEMALES

Year
Doctorate
Conferred

INBRED
NONINBRED
-____________________________________________________
Total
Total
Percent at 1st Position
n
Percent at 1st Position
n

1977

50.0

2

83.3

6

1976

0.0

1

76.9

13

1975

71.4

7

56.0

25

1974

100.0

3

45.5

22

1973

100.0

2

50.0

16

1972

100.0

3

46.2

13

1971

66.7

3

50.0

18

1970

100.0

2

42.9

3

1969

66.7

3

53.8

13

1968

66.7

3

50.0

10
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TABLE 13
CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS OF INBRED AND NON-INBRED MALE FACULTY
HOLDING FIRST AND SUBSEQUENT ACADEMIC POSITIONS
Position
First

Subsequent

Origin
Inbred
Noninbred

a 2

x CD = 24.075

p = .000

80

19

420

353
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TABLE 14
CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS OF INBRED AND NON-INBRED
FEMALE FACULTY HOLDING FIRST AND SUBSEQUENT ACADEMIC POSITIONS

Position
First

Subsequent

Origin

Inbred

22

7

Noninbred

77

66

ax2(1) = 3.925

p = 0.047
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the null hypotheses that there is no relation between retention
at the first position and institutional origin.

The data shows a

much higher percentage of inbred faculty still in the first posi
tion.

This is contrary to the idea that inbred faculty are forced

out of their first positions with a higher frequency than noninbreds.
Statistical Hypothesis Three
Statistical hypotheses 3a and 3b examined the relationship
between years served prior to promotion and institutional origin
for male and female associate professors:
H^a —

there is no difference in years served prior to promo

tion to associate professor between inbred and noninbred male
faculty of that rank,
—

there is no difference in years served prior to pro

motion to associate professor between inbred and noninbred female
faculty of that rank.
One-way analysis of covariance was used to test the relation
ship between years to promotion and institutional origin while con
trolling for the effects of four important productivity variables.
The number of covariates was kept to a minimum to meet the restric
tions of the computational package.

The four variables chosen as

covariates were
Weekly hours of administration
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Weekly hours of formal Instruction
Number of books published (total)
Number of articles published (total).
The covariates were chosen because of their possible influ
ence on the promotion decision.

All four reflect productive ef

forts which affect the institution.

The variables for total counts

for books and articles were used rather than rates of production,
because promotion decisions are more likely to be based on total
works with some required threshold number.

Rates of productivity

would not differentiate between a first year person with two pub
lications and a fourth year person with eight, while it is, of
course, more likely that the latter would receive a promotion.
The time spent in administration and formal instruction reflect
the other two primary tasks which benefit the institution.

No

variables were included which measured time spent in consulting
or other external activities as it was concluded that these ef
forts rarely have a significant impact on promotion decisions.
The results of the analyses (shown in Table 15) reveal the
differential impact of institutional origin on years to promotion

Insert Table 15 About Here

to associate.

The main effect, inbreeding, is significant at the

p < .05 level for female faculty only.

While one of the product!-
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TABLE 15
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE RESULTS FOR YEARS SERVED
PRIOR TO PROMOTION TO ASSOCIATE

F Value

Source of Variation

F Significance

Males (n=614)
Covariates
Weekly hours of administration

2.621

0.106

Weekly hours of formal instruction

3.186

0.075

Number of books published

6.229

0.013

Number of articles published

0.458

0.499

0.214

0.644

Weekly hours of administration

0.019

0.890

Weekly hours of formal instruction

0.005

0.942

Number of books published

0.981

0.326

Number of articles published

0.259

0.612

4.518

0.037

Main Effects
Inbreeding

Females (n=7 3)

Covariates

Main Effects
Inbreeding
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tivlty variables is significantly related to time to promotion for
males, none are for females.

The mean time to promotion to associ

ate professor is 7.62 years for inbred women and 5.60 years for
noninbred women.
Statistical Hypothesis Four
Statistical hypotheses 4a and 4b examine the same basic re
lationship as the two previous hypotheses, with the subject group
changed to full professors and the time variable measured as years
to promotion to that rank:
H^a —

there is no difference in years served prior to promo

tion to full professor between inbred and noninbred male faculty
of that rank,
—

there is no difference in years served prior to promo

tion to full professor between inbred and noninbred female faculty
of that rank.
One-way analysis of covariance was again used to test this
relationship.

The subjects included all full professors holding

academic doctoral degrees teaching at research or doctoral grant
ing universities.

The four covariates used to test Hypotheses 3a

and 3b were used in these analyses as these general criteria for
promotion apply regardless of the rank.
The results (shown in Table 16) indicate that the main effect,

Insert Table 16 About Here
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TABLE 16
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE RESULTS FOR YEARS SERVED
PRIOR TO PROMOTION TO FULL PROFESSOR

Source of Variation

F Value

F Significance

Males Cn=953)

Covariates
Weekly hours of administration

0.690

0.406

Weekly hours of formal instruction

2.051

0.152

Number of books published

9.942

0.002

19.040

0.000

0.988

0.318

0.960

0.330

Weekly hours of formal instruction

0.015

0.902

Number of books published

1.075

0.303

Number of articles published

1.606

0.209

0.008

0.929

Number of articles published
Main Effects
Inbreeding

Females (n=79)

Covariates
Weekly hours of administration

Main Effects
Inbreeding
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inbreeding, was not significantly related to years served prior to
promotion to full professor for either males or females.
hypothesis cannot be rejected.

The null

As with the results for time to

associate, there are productivity variables which are significant
for males, but there are none which are significant for females.
It is interesting to note that the average time to full professor
is slightly less for inbreds of both sexes.
Statistical Hypothesis Five
The relationship between rank and institution origin is
examined in hypotheses 5a and 5b:
Hc —
5a

There is no difference in the distribution of ranks

between inbred and noninbred male faculty.
H C1_ —
5b

there is no difference in the distribution of ranks

between inbred and noninbred female faculty.
As the results in Table 17 show, the Chi-square statistic is

Insert Table 17 About Here
significant for male faculty, but not significant for female fac
ulty.

The null hypothesis of no relationship between origin and

distribution of ranks is rejected for men only.

The extension of

the analysis to an examination of the percentage of inbred and
noninbred males does not reveal a clear direct or inverse rela
tionship between inbreeding and rank.

The percent of inbred

faculty at the instructor, full professor, and distinguished pro-
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TABLE 17

CHI-SQUARE RESULTS FOR FACULTY IN RANK BY INSTITUTIONAL ORIGIN

ORIGIN
Inbred

Rank

Outbred

Males
Distinguished Professor

13

44

143

894

Associate Professor

63

594

Assistant Professor

50

436

7

13

Full Professor

Instructor
Chi-Square

23.929

0.000

Significance

Females

Distinguished Professor

0

0

Full Professor

12

72

Associate Professor

17

67

Assistant Professor

20

112

1

5

Instructor
Chi-Square

1.329

Significance

0.722
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fessor ranks are greater than the percent of nonlnbred faculty at
these ranks.
Statistical Hypothesis Six
Statistical hypotheses 6a and 6b are analogous to hypotheses
3 and 4 in that they measure time to receipt of an institutional
reward —
R,

6a

in this case tenure:
—

there is no difference in the years served prior to

receipt of tenure between inbred and noninbred male faculty.
—

there is no difference in the years served prior to

receipt of tenure between inbred and noninbred female faculty.
As with the third and fourth hypotheses, analysis of covari
ance was used to test hypotheses 6a and 6b.

Because of the simi

larity in the criteria for the promotion and tenure decisions, the
same four institutional productivity variables were used as covari
ates.

Only tenured faculty at research or doctoral granting insti

tutions with academic doctorates were included in this analysis.
The effect of inbreeding is not significant for either males
or females (see Table 18).

The only F-ratio that is significant

Insert Table 18 About Here
in this analysis is the relationship of the number of books pro
duced to years to tenure for male faculty.
Statistical Hypothesis Seven
The existence of wage discrimination in the compensation of
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TABLE 18
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE RESULTS
FOR YEARS SERVED PRIOR TO THE RECEIPT OF TENURE

F Value

Source of Variation

Significance

Males (n=1593)
Covariates
Weekly hours of administration

0.655

0.419

0.100

0.751

14.498

0.000

2.555

0.110

2.309

0.129

1.321

0.244

Weekly hours of formal instruction

0.246

0.621

Number of books published

0.218

0.642

Number of articles published

0.004

0.953

0.203

0.653

Weekly hours of formal instruction
Number of books published
Number of articles published
Main Effect
Inbreeding
Females (n=156)
Covariates
Weekly hours of administration

Main Effect
Inbreeding
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inbred faculty is considered in the single seventh statistical hy
pothesis:
—

there is no difference in institutional rewards between

inbred and noninbred faculty.
Unlike the preceeding five hypotheses, the seventh is not
written separately for female and male faculty because the regres
sion methodology conveniently allows the inclusion of sex as a
dummy independent variable.
The testing of this hypothesis involved three distinct steps:
the development of a model of the salaries of noninbred faculty
through the use of regression analysis; the use of this model to
predict the salaries of inbred faculty; and the determination of
the significance of the difference between the predicted and
actual salaries for the inbred faculty.
A regression model was developed using the Statistical Analy
sis System (SAS Institute, 1979) for the 2323 noninbred faculty
holding academic doctorates and teaching at research and doctoral
granting universities.

The independent variables were selected

according to impact on salary.

Most of the variables are standard

effort and productivity measures.
explanation.
minants.

Several, however, require more

Two, race and sex, are not legitimate salary deter

Nevertheless, it was felt that they were likely to have

a significant impact on the existing pattern of remuneration and
consequently they were included in the analysis.

The size of the
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coefficients for these variables (both were significant at the
p < .05 level) indicate that the
importance were justified.

a

priori assumptions about their

Age and experience appear as squared

variables because the compounding nature of salary increments often
leads to a curvilinear relationship with time variables.

A final

non-productivity variable was a measure of the prestige of the
institution with lower numbers representing higher prestige.

The

coefficients for the variables, the intercept, and the percent of
variance;explained are shown in Table 19.

Insert Table 19 About Here
Values for the independent variables for each of the 353 inbred faculty were multiplied by the coefficients obtained in the
previous step, resulting in a predicted salary for each inbred
subject.

This figure represents the amount the people would have

earned if ...theys’ . had been rewarded for their efforts, produc
tivity, and other characteristics as noninbred faculty were com
pensated.

A residual value for each subject was calculated by

subtracting the actual salary from the predicted amount.
The mean of the distribution of residuals was $426, indica
ting that the inbred faculty were paid, on the average, $426 less
than noninbred faculty with equivalent attributes.

A t-statistic

was computed to test the hypothesis that the mean of the popula
tion equalled zero.

The t-value (1.86) is significant at the
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TABLE 19

RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR HYPOTHESIS 7

Independent Variables
Books
none
1-2
3-4
5-10
more than 10
Articles
none
1-2
3-4
5-10

11-20
21-30
31-50
more than 50
Weekly Hours of Teaching
none
1-4
5-6
7-8
9-10
11-12
13-16
17-20
more than 20

Coefficient

-801
-353
919
1702
1821

-5388
-4976
-4465
-4482
-3039
-1945
-1304
699

1193
547
177
-288
-342
-118
-1200
-2649
-1068

jekly Hours of Research and Scholarly Writing
none
-500
1-4
-282
5-8
-319
9-16
-40
17-34
191
more than 34
-381
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Weekly Hours of Counseling Students
none
1-4
5-8
9-16
17-34
more than 34
Weekly Hours of Administration
none
1-4
5-8
9-16
17-34
more than 34

349
35
2
-332
-771
-4310

-34
122
672
791
3281
4016

Sex

814

Race

761

Field
Social Sciences

59

Humanities and Fine Arts

-1413

Natural Sciences

-557

Applied Professional fields
Experience

885
454

Experience squared

-5

Age squared

0

Prestige

-95

Other results

Intercept
Adjusted R

$19,216
2

.59
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p < .05 level, indicating that the null hypothesis (that the mean
equals zero) was rejected.
Discussion
The results of the three analyses for the first statistical
hypothesis (summarized in Figure 5) support the rejection of the
Insert Figure 5 About Here
null hypothesis.

All four related tests of the D

significant at' least at the p < .01 level.

?

statistic were

Regardless of which

set of variables was included, significant differences between
inbred women and inbred men were found.

The variables which were

significant in the analyses, when combined with information pro
vided by the means of the male and female groups on those vari
ables (.shown in Table 20), provided insight into the nature of
Insert Table 20 About Here

the differences between the groups.
In the overall analysis (1), the standardized discriminant
coefficients indicated that the rate of production for total books
adjusted for effort had the highest relative contribution to the
discriminant function.

An examination of the means for this vari

able indicated a higher productivity for women than for men.
The next highest coefficient was computed for the production
of books in the last 2 years, adjusted by effort.

The means on
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Figure 5: Summary of Results for Hypothesis One

Significance
Level

Null
Rejected

Analysis
Number

Variables
Included

One

All productivity

.001

Yes

Two a

Output (adjusted
for experience and
effort)

.001

Yes

Output (adjusted
for experience only)

.001

Yes

Effort

.01

Yes

Two b

Three
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TABLE 20

MEANS BY SEX FOR VARIABLES IN DISCRIMINANT FUNCTIONS

Males

Variable

Females

Weekly Hours of Teaching

2.83

2.94

Weekly Hours of Administration

2.79

2.64

Weekly Hours of Formal Instruction

3.38

3.40

Above Salary Earnings

3.23

2.46

Receipt of Research Funding (last year)

1.38

1.64

Service as a Paid Consultant (last 2 years)

1.32

1.33

Research: Applied

1.17

1.30

Research: Policy-oriented

1.56

1.54

Articles: Rate of Production Adjusted
by Effort (AREF)

0.15

0.17

Books: Rate of Production Adjusted
by Effort (BREF)

0.07

0.10

Articles: Last Two Years Productivity
Adjusted by Effort (A2EF)

2.13

2.62

Books: Last Two Years Productivity
Adjusted by Effort (B2EF)

1.61

1.41

Other Writings: Last Two Years Productivity
Adjusted by Effort (02EF)

2.00

2.04

Books: Overall Productivity Adjusted for
Experience (BRATE)

0.21

0.26

aBinary variables coded

Yes = 1

and No = 2
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this variable indicated

that male inbred faculty had produced more

books in the last two years per unit of effort.

Males were also

more likely to have received research funding in the last twelve
months (the third variable in terms of importance) and had higher
percentages of above salary earnings (the fifth variable).
The means of the fourth and sixth variables (in terms of
coefficient size), rate of total article production adjusted by
effort (AREF), and production of articles in the last two years
adjusted by effort (A2EF), Showed greater productivity by women.
On other significant variables, women did more formal instruction
while men did more administration and were more likely to have
served as a paid consultant.
The overall pattern shown in the results of the first dis
criminant analysis was that women show higher performance in the
traditional institutional areas while men seem to emphasize exter
nal pursuits.

Women had higher productivity for both article

categories and one of the two book categories.
more time in formal instruction.

They also spent

The male orientation toward ex

ternal activities was demonstrated in higher above salary earnings
and higher probabilities for the receipt of research funding and
appointment as a paid consultant.
The analyses of the first statistical hypothesis using only
productivity variables (2a and 2b) show much the same results as
the overall analysis (1).

Where the variables are adjusted for
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both experience and effort (2a), overall book productivity is
again the most heavily weighted variable.

It is followed by two-

year article productivity and two-year book productivity.

Six of

the nine possible variables are included in the discriminant func
tion.

The three excluded items are binary variables reflecting

receipt of research funding and work as a paid consultant.
Only two of the nine variables available in the analysis of
productivity adjusted for experience (2b) were included in the
final solution.

Receipt of research funding in the last year and

the number of books produced adjusted for years of experience
were the only variables in the function.
The third analysis included only variables reflecting effort.
Above salary earnings and weekly hours of teaching appeared in the
final discriminant function.

Examination of the means on these

variables indicate that men have higher above salary earnings and
women spend more time in the classroom.
The results of the analyses for statistical hypothesis two
(summarized with the results for hypotheses 3 through 6)in Figure
6 indicated that there was a significant difference in retention
Insert Figure 6
rates for both sexes when ten one-year cohorts are studied to
gether.

The distribution of faculty indicated that it was more

likely that an inbred subject would stay at the first position.
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Figure 6

Summary of the Results for Statistical Hypotheses 2 through 6

Hypothesis
Number

Dependent
Variable

Sex

Statistical
Test

Null
Rejected

2a

Longevity at first
position

Male

Chi-square

yes

2b

Longevity at first
position

Female

Chi-square

yes

3a

Years to promotion
(Associate)

Male

Analysis of
Covariance

no

3b

Years to promotion
(Associate)

Female

Analysis of
Covariance

yes

4a

Years to promotion
(Full)

Male

Analysis of
Covariance

no

4b

Years to promotion
(Full)

Female

Analysis of
Covariance

no

5a

Rank

Male

Chi-square

yes

5b

Rank

Female

Chi-square

no

6a

Years to tenure

Male

Analysis of
Covariance

no

6b

Years to tenure

Female

Analysis of
Covariance

no
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Initially this seemed contrary to the usual concern that inbred
faculty are terminated solely because of their institutional ori
gin.

In fact, a critical variable was missing from the analysis —

the individual's aspirations for mobility.

Calculations based on

the number of faculty who have not moved are biased by the poten
tially higher propensity toward mobility of noninbred faculty.
A narrower interpretation of the question, differentiating
between voluntary and involuntary mobility, would have provided
more insight into the treatment of inbred faculty.

For example,

an hypothesis about the relative frequency of involuntary termi
nation would better serve the purpose of identifying differences
in retention policy.

Unfortunately, the 1977 Survey data could

not support this type of analysis.
Beyond the first year, a higher percentage of inbred faculty
were in the first job.

If the cross-sectional results over ten

cohorts do reflect trends, it is more likely that inbreds are
immobile over time.

As such, they are a potential model for all

immobile faculty
The analyses for hypotheses 3 and 4 included two significant
improvements over most earlier efforts to evaluate the effects of
institutional origin.

First, a more precise definition of the

dependent variable was used.

As the time to promotion was mea

sured from the start of the first full-time teaching position,
the confounding effect of the inclusion of service as a research
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or teaching assistant was avoided.

Second, through the sample

selection and the inclusion of covariates in the analyses, a sig
nificant amount of irrelevant variation was removed from the final
test for the significance of the main effect.

Only faculty with

doctoral degrees were included in the analysis and the primary
institutional productivity variables were used as covariates.
Only one of the analyses for the third and fourth statistical
hypotheses yielded significant results.

For female associate pro

fessors, inbreeding was significantly related to the time served
prior to promotion to that rank.

The mean time to associate was

greater for inbred than noninbred women.

These results indicate

that inbreeding is a handicap in a critical career movement for
women, but not for men.
As there were only eleven inbred female full professors in
cluded in the analysis for hypothesis 4b, it is probable that the
lack of significance may reflect the insufficient cell size.

It

may also be the case that the promotion to associate is the signif
icant hurdle in the career stream for women and once that obstacle
is passed, the later decisions are not influenced by institutional
origin.
Another interesting result from these analyses was found in
the impact of the institutionally-based productivity measures used
for covariates.

For men at both ranks at least one of the covari

ates had a statistically significant relationship with the depen
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dent variable.

At least in some ways time to promotion for males

is related to productivity.

For females, on the other hand, none

of the covariates was significant at either rank.

With the excep

tion of the significant result for the main effects for female
associate professors noted above, there was no significant syste
matic relationship between time to promotion for women and any of
the variables.

The lack of an apparent relationship between the

productivity variables and time to promotion for women is disturb
ing.

Since it appears that the time is determined by variables

other than these important measures of productivity.

One possible

conclusion is that the time to promotion is capriciously deter
mined.

As not all legitimate predictors have been included as co

variates in these analyses, this conclusion cannot be substantiated.
It is, however, suspicious that none of the covariates was signifi
cant.
The analyses for the fifth hypothesis found that the distri
bution of ranks was significantly different between inbred and non
inbred males.

Examination of the distribution of ranks for the

two male groups revealed that inbred faculty were concentrated at
the lowest (instructor) rank and the two highest ranks (full and
distinguished professor). This distribution supports a bimodal
theory of inbred performance.

If males are inbred either because

they are at the top or the bottom of their peer groups, the result
would be high concentrations at the highest and lowest ranks.

The
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competent group would progress rapidly to full or distinguished
professor, and the bottom group would be used and then terminated
prior to promotion into the mainstream of the faculty ranks.
There is also a possibility of a confounding effect due to
length of service in this type of cross-sectional analysis.

Facul

ty who are now full professors passed the critical career barriers
of promotion and tenure in earlier years.

The earlier these deci

sions were made, the greater the market pressure to keep a faculty
member.

The higher percentage of inbreds in.the top ranks may re

flect the lower institutional power in the job marketplace at the
time of promotion.

It would have been easier to enforce any in-

breeding prohibitions as the labor markets tightened providing
more applicants for each job.
In the analysis of the distribution of ranks for women in hy
pothesis 5b, the null was not rejected.

It is interesting to ob

serve, in comparing the results for hypothesis 5a to those for 5b,
that there was a much larger concentration of women than men at
assistant professor and that there were no female distinguished
professors.
The analysis of time to tenure for hypothesis 6 resulted in
no significant results for the main effect, inbreeding.

Given

the rigidity of most faculty regulations about the granting of
tenure, these results were reasonable.

It was mildly surprising

to note that any variable was significant.

For males, production
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of books was significantly related to time served prior to the
receipt of tenure.
The first step in the analysis for the seventh hypothesis was
the derivation of an equation for the determination of salaries
for the noninbred faculty.

The coefficients in this equation indi

cated the relative rewards to the various activities included as
independent variables.

Examination of the coefficients provided

some interesting information about the reward structure in higher
education.
Higher returns were given to those who produce more books and
more articles, and who did more administrative work.

In general,

lower rewards were given for larger commitments to teaching and
counseling students.
were ambiguous.

The coefficients for time spent in research

The lack of a constant relationship between time

spent in research and rewards, and the increasing returns for
higher levels of book and article productivity probably reflects
the fact that research rewards are based primarily on output and
not on effort.
The variables reflecting characteristics, not activities,
also provided insight into the salary structure.

The highest

field coefficient was for applied professional subjects with the
social sciences, natural sciences, and humanities and fine arts
following in order of decreasing coefficients.

The values for

sex and race indicated that premiums were paid for males and non-
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Caucasians.

The intercept for the regression equation was $19,216.

The results indicated that the equation accounted for 59 percent
of the variance in the salaries.

This value is within the range

of R squares reported in other salary equity studies.

Therefore,

it can be reasonably concluded that this regression equation is
sufficiently accurate for the determination of salary equity.
The analysis for the seventh hypothesis continued with the
use of the regression equation to predict salaries for the inbred
subjects.

The t-test performed on the differences between the

predicted and actual salaries indicated that the mean of the popu
lation was significantly different than zero.

As the residual

between the predicted and actual salaries impounded any variation
not resulting from the independent variables, the interpretation
of the results depended on the completeness of the list predictor
variables.

As the independent variables used in this analysis

included all generally-accepted legitimate salary determinants as
well as sex and race (the two primary discriminatory factors), it
was reasonable to assume that the residuals were the result of
institutional origin.

The mean of the residuals indicated that

inbred faculty were paid $426 less, on the average, than noninbred
faculty of equivalent characteristics.
To better understand the magnitude of this difference it is
useful to compare it to the salary levels of faculty members.

To

do so required the development of a hypothetical faculty member.
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This person was assumed to be a white male, teaching in the humani
ties, with one or two books and three of four articles.

Each week

he spends nine to ten hours teaching, nine to sixteen hours on
research, one to four hours counseling students, and five to eight
hours in administration.

It was also assumed that he has four

years of experience and teaches at an institution at the highest
prestige level and that he is inbred.
Application of the regression model to this hypothetical
individual yielded a salary of $14,094.
approximately 3% of the computed salary.

The $426 difference was
Although the recent high

rates of inflation make this seem like a small difference, it was
statistically significant and would certainly have been material
to the recipient.
Summary
The results of this research indicated that inbred women can
be differentiated from inbred men.

All of the discriminant analy

ses were significant at least at the p < .01 level.

Differences

on the means of the variables indicated that women were more in
volved in teaching and other traditional activities and that men
were more productive on external factors.
The analysis of the relative treatment of inbred faculty on
professional advancement variables found only four significant re
sults.

Regardless of sex, inbred faculty were more likely to be

in their first position.

Inbred men were concentrated in high
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and low ranks and inbred women served more time prior to promotion
to associate.
The use of a regression model based on noninbred faculty to
predict the salaries of inbred faculty indicated a premium was paid
for noninbred status.
at the p < .05 level.

The difference was statistically significant

Chapter 5

INSTITUTIONAL ORIGIN AND LABOR MARKET POLICY
The origin of this research study was in an interest in the
operation of the academic marketplace.

The goal was not to pro

vide an esoteric analysis, but rather to expand the knowledge of
the labor market in a manner which would provide results which
would be of use to participants in the marketplace.

However, cer

tain definitional and methodological advances were included.

In

this research, the standard definition of productivity was expanded
and multivariate analyses were used.

These technical contribu

tions are discussed in the first section of this chapter and the
limitations of the study are covered in the second section.

The

final sections review the results of the research and the implica
tions of these results for institutional policy.
Technical Advancements
Most research on academic productivity utilizes definitions
which are based only on research activities.

Commonly-used vari

ables include the number of articles and the number of books
written.

This research included information on teaching, adminis

tration, acquisition of research grants, work as a consultant,
and type of research undertaken.

It was felt that the standard

research-based definition of productivity did not properly reflect
the variety of value-producing activities routinely undertaken by
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faculty members.
In addition to expanding the number of activities, several of
the analyses included an adjustment to the book, article, and
other writing variables for the amount of time spent on research
each week.

This provided for a further inclusion of the task mix

in the determination of productivity.
The present research also used an hypothesis testing addition
to the standard regression methodology for salary discrimination.
The use of a t-test on the residuals of the comparison of predicted
and actual salaries for the unfavored group allows the determina
tion of the statistical significance of discriminations.
Limitations
No analysis can be better than the data used as input.

The

1977 Survey provided primarily cross-sectional data with some indi
cators of longitudinal data, such as times of promotion and years
in higher education.

Longitudinal data would probably have given

a better view of the academic production and reward processes.
However, such data was not readily available and its acquisition
for such a large sample was virtually impossible.
Another limitation of the data was its source.
vey data was collected directly from the subjects.

The 1977 Sur
Although self-

reported data is generally suspect, Allison and Stewart (1974)
found a correlation of .94 between self-reponted number of publi
cations and results from a survey of abstracts.

As there is no
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reason to believe that the propensity to give false data was greater
for any group of interest in this research, the potential selfreport bias was not judged to be a severe problem.
A final limitation of the study involved the number of sub
jects.

With only fifty inbred women, the results, especially where

only part of the pool was included may have been influenced by the
small number of subjects.

This effect was most probable in the

analysis for statistical hypothesis 4b.
female, inbred full professors.

There were only eleven

It was, however, unrealistic to

conclude that the small number of female inbred faculty is due to
sampling errors.

Given the low percentages of women and inbred

faculty, the small number of people meeting both these criteria
was realistic.
The Treatment of Inbred Faculty
One of the objectives of this research was to expand the
knowledge of the labor market in a way which would yield results
valuable to participants in the marketplace.

With this goal in

mind, it is reasonable to reverse the order of the research hypo
theses and first ask if there is discrimination against inbred
faculty.
The review of the literature in chapter two showed that the
one idea that all of the studies agreed on was the undesirability
of inbreeding.

The pessimism reflected in Eliot's (1908) early

warning pervades the literature.

Regardless of whether studies
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were designed to support or refute the thesis that inbred faculty
are less productive, the underlying assumption was that the pheno
menon has a negative impact.
The opportunity for the distaste against inbreeding to be
acted upon in the form of discrimination has certainly existed in
both the internal and external academic labor markets.

As early

as 1935, the potential for differential treatment was recognized
in the literature.

Eells and Cleveland (1935a) speculated that

inbred faculty were hired as a matter of economy.

McGee (I960)

argued that universities manipulated the demands on and rewards to
inbred faculty to allow surplus resources to be diverted for non
inbred faculty.

The question of the existence of discrimination

against inbred faculty was addressed in the second and third hypo
theses.

The former considered bias in decisions concerning pro

fessional advancement; the latter examined the distribution of
institutional rewards.
Research hypotheses two through six were designed to test for
discrimination in the major categories reflecting professional
advancement: retention in the first position, years to promotion
(both to associate and to full professor), rank, and years to
acquisition of tenure.

All of these measures of professional

advancement were under the control of the university and, there
fore, potentially subject to bias based on institutional origin.
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The only analysis in the present study which clearly indi
cated the existence of discrimination against inbred faculty was
the examination of time to promotion to the rank of associate pro
fessor for female faculty (statistical hypothesis 3b). The main
effect, inbreeding, was found to be statistically significant
while the effects of the productivity covariates were not.

Inbred

women served longer periods of time before promotion to associate
than noninbred women and the difference cannot be explained by
major productivity factors.

Although this result reflected only

one measure of professional advancement, its effects should not be
minimized.

Promotion to associate is a critical step in the pro

fessional career path and one which might, in itself, influence
later decisions.
The result of the analysis of the distribution of ranks among
inbred and outbred male faculty was also significant.

However,

the interpretation of the results was more difficult and a clear
judgement of discrimination against inbred faculty could not be
substantiated.

A higher concentration of inbred faculty was found

at the rank of instructor —

a result which would indicate bias.

But higher concentrations of inbreds were also found at the two
highest ranks —
crimination.

a result which was contrary to the notion of dis

Without further analysis to explain the bimodal na

ture of the relative distribution, the significant results cannot
be used to demonstrate discrimination.
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Stronger evidence, both in terms of results and methodology,
indicating the existence of bias against inbred faculty was found
in the examination of institutional rewards.

Testing for the dif

ferences in compensation is a difficult problem because of the
large number of variables which impact on the determination of
rewards.

Multiple regression analysis has become the technique of

choice for the modeling of salaries because of its capacity to
include the variance from many characteristics through their inclu
sion as independent variables.

This type of analysis is methodo

logically stronger than the comparison of means which was used in
previous inbreeding studies.
The results of the analysis on institutional rewards indicated
that there were significant differences in compensation based on
institutional origin.

Further examination of the data revealed

that inbred faculty were paid on the ayerage significantly less
than noninbred faculty of equivalent characteristics.
Armed with the results of the second and third research hypo
theses which indicate that some discrimination against inbred
faculty existed, especially in the critical area of monetary com
pensation, it would seem reasonable to move on to a prescription
for the abandonment of prohibitions and biases against inbred
faculty.

However, it is first useful to return to the major

research hypothesis and ask whether inbred women are different
than inbred men.

The context for answering this question is the
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economic theory based on job market signaling behavior which was
used to guide this research.
The Performance of Male and Female Inbred Faculty
As explained in chapter 1, the job market (internal or exter
nal) uses signals, given by prospective employees, to evaluate
potential productivity.

The employer tailors the conditions of

the employment offer, and possibly the very fact of the offer it
self, according to the productivity expected from the individual
job seeker.

The greater the correspondence between the signals

given by the prospective employees and their later productivity,
the greater the efficiency of the labor market.

The mechanism

which facilitates the extension of signals by job seekers is the
cost of signaling.

The information-based models of the labor mar

ket normally assume equal signaling costs across all job seekers.
The assumption of equal signaling costs is not appropriate
when analyzing the impact of institutional origin in the academic
marketplace.

Because of often limited geographic mobility due to

personal concerns, women may experience a higher cost to signal
outbred than men.

As a result, women who are in fact highly pro

ductive may give the low productivity signal (inbred). If it is
then assumed that they must be low producers because they are
inbred, the market is discriminating against the highly productive
women by using a signal which does not reflect reality.
The important question is whether inbred women are indeed
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different than inbred men and whether the differences indicate
higher productivity.

The analyses for the first statistical hypo

thesis were directed at determining if significant differences
exist between male and female inbred faculty.
ed that significant differences do exist.

The results indicat

Further examination of

the data indicated that women show higher performance in most tra
ditional institutional areas while men seem to emphasize external
activities.

Women had higher productivity for both article cate

gories and one of the two book categories used in the study.
also spent more time in formal instruction.

They

The male orientation

toward external activities was demonstrated in higher above salary
earnings and higher probabilities for the receipt of research fund
ing and appointment as a paid consultant.

To the extent that

institutions favor traditional teaching and research services over
those activities which benefit external parties, women should
receive higher institutional rewards.
Implications
This research has shown that inbreeding is a signal which is
treated negatively in the academic labor market.

There is negative

treatment in reward decisions and to a lesser extent in measures
of professional advancement.

The negative valence attached to

inbreeding indicates that it is assumed to be a signal of low
productivity.

While previous studies have indicated that inbreed

ing is, in fact, an indicator of lowered productivity, none of
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these studies has taken into account the possible differences be
tween male and female inbred faculty.

Significantly, the results

of this study indicate that inbred women are more productive in
institutional services than inbred men.
As the results of this research indicated that inbred women
are significantly different than inbred men, a recommendation of
differential treatment seems to be in order.

Even if the inbreed

ing signal has worked correctly for males, there is reason now to
question its applicability to women.

Although further research on

the relationship between inbreeding and productivity is needed to
determine whether the signal is properly applied to males, it is
in the interest of market efficiency to argue for the abandonment
of inbreeding as a signal altogether because it is no longer sui
tably reliable as an indicator of productivity across all appli
cants.

The cost of defending and maintaining a rule used only for

one sex would not be balanced by the gains from the use of such a
rule.

Individual promotion and retention decisions should be based

on the characteristics actually exhibited by the person being
evaluated and not on the surrogate of institutional origin.
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APPENDIX A
Questionnaire Items by Variable Category

I.

Inbreeding
32. Please list (beginning with the most recent) the academic
degrees which you have been awarded, the institution grant
ing each, and the year in which each was obtained.
Degree

Institution

Year

34. At how many colleges or universities have you been employed
f u l l - t i m e
(beyond the level of teaching or research assis
tant) ?
Only this one
Two.........
Three.......
Four........

Five........
Six........
Seven or more

II. Research Productivity
A. Journal Articles
48. How many articles have you published in academic or pro
fessional journals?
None.............
1-2
3-4..............
5-10

11-20..............
21-30..............
31-50..............
More than 50.......

49. How many of your professional writings have been published
or accepted for publication in the last two years?
One............
Two............
Three..........
Four...........

Five...............
Six-ten............
More than ten.......
None...............
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E. Books or Monographs
47. How many books or monographs have you published or edited,
alone or in collaboration?
None
1-2 .

5-10.......
More than 10

3-4.
See also Question 41 (supra)
C. Research Findings
50. Have you ever received research funding from any source?
Yes.........

No........

51. In the past 12 months, have you received any?
Yes........

No.........

52. [IF YES] from which of the following did you receive
funding? (Mark all that apply)
Past 12
Ever
Months
a. Institutional or departmental funds...
b . Federal agencies....................
c. State or local government agencies....
d. Private foundations.................
e. Private industry....................
III. Prestige
71. Within the past two years, have you received an offer of
another job or a serious inquiry about your availability
for another position?
An offer..................................
Not an offer, but a serious inquiry.......
Neither...................................
72. Within the past two years, have you sought, or made a serious
inquiry about another position?
Sought another position.....................
Not sought, but made a serious inquiry
.
Neither....................................
79. Comparing yourself with other academic persons of your age
and qualifications, how successful do you consider yourself
in your career?
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Fairly unsuccessful
Very unsuccessful..

Very successful..
Fairly successful
IV. Other Descriptive Variables
Teaching effort

42. During the current term, how many hours per week are you
spending in formal instruction in class? (If on leave,
indicate what your normal teaching load would be.)
None
1-4.
5-6.
7-8.
9-10

11-12....
13-16....
17-20....
21 or more

41. During the present term, how many hours per week, on the
average, are you actually spending in connection with your
staff position in each of the following activities:
<u

a
o

■<r

oo
m

a. Administration..........
b. Scheduled teaching (actual
hours)..................
c. Preparing for teaching
(including reading papers,
grading)................
d. Advising and counseling
students................
e. Research and scholarly
writing.................
Consulting
53. Have you ever served as a paid consultant?
Yes........

No.........

54. In the past two years have you served in such a capacity?
Yes........

No.........

55. [IF YES] To which of the following have you served?
(Mark all that apply)
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Ever

Past Two Years

a. Local business.............
b. Local government or school...
c. National corporation........
d. Federal government.........
e. Other......................
Role Description
56. Some faculty members are inclined to think of themselves as
"intellectuals." Others find "scholar," "scientist,"
"teacher," or "professional" more satisfactory descriptors.
Which of these terms describes you best? Which is the poorest
descriptor?
a. Best
b. Poorest
Intellectual.................
Professional.................
Scholar......................
Scientist....................
Teacher......................
57. Do your interests lie primarily in research or in teaching?
Very heavily
In both, but
In both, but
Very heavily

in research.............
leaning toward research...
leaning toward teaching...
in teaching.............

See also Question 41 (supra).
58. Would you characterize your recent scholarship, research, or
creative writing as:
Yes
a.
b.
c.
d.

No

Pure or basic..............
Applied....................
Policy oriented............
Literary or expressive......

59. In many disciplines, faculty members differ in seeingtheir
work as primarily in the area of theory, or as largely sub
stantive or experimental. Is your work:
Largely theoretical...............................
Largely substantive or experimental................
The distinction is not applicable in my discipline...
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V. Compensation
43. What is your basic institutional salary, before taxes and
deductions, for the current academic year?
Below $10,000.......
$10,000-$11,999.....
$12,000-$13,999.....
$14,000-$16,999.....
$17,000-$19,999.....
$20,000-$24,999.....

$25,000-$29,999..
$30,000-$34,999..
$35,000-$39,999..
$40,000-$44,999..
$45,000-$49,999..
$50,000 and over.

44. Is this based on
9/10 months........

11/12 months

45. In recent years, roughly how much have you earned over and
above your basic salary? (Please estimate as a percentage of
your basic salary.)
0%...........
Under 10%....
10%-19%.......
20%-29%.......

30%-39%.....
40%-49%.....
50% and over.

VI. Demographics
Rank
38. What is your present rank?
Instructor...........
Assistant Professor....
Associate Professor....
Professor..........

Distinguished/"Named"
Professorship.....
Lecturer...........
No ranks designated..
Other..............

35. How long have you been employed on a full-time basis in higher
education?...at your present institution? How many years have
you held your present rank?
a. In higher education
b. At your institution
c. In present rank
r
0-2 years..................................
3-5 years
.............................
6-10 years.................................
11-15 years...............................
16-20 years................................
More than 20 years..........................

a

,
b

c
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Tenure Status

39. What kind of appointment do you now hold?
Regular with tenure...
Regular without tenure
Yearly appointment
(soft money)
.......

Acting..
Visiting
Other...

40. [IF TENURED] in what year were you awarded tenure?
Field, Sex, Age, & Race
46. From the following list, mark one subject in each column;
mark the most appropriate fine categories, if applicable;
where your precise field does not appear, mark the most
similar category.
a. Highest postgraduate degree
b. School, division, or department where principal
appointment is held
c. Present principal teaching field
d. Present primary field of research, scholarship, creativity
108. Your sex:
Female........

Male.........

109. How old are you?________________
112. Your race:
Black/Negro/Afro-American.
.....
White/Caucas ian..................
Oriental.........................
Other............................
106. What is your marital status?
Never married.........................
Married, living with spouse...........
Married, separated from spouse.........
Divorced..............................
Widowed..............................

Reference Notes

Linnell, R. H. Age, sex and ethnic trade-offs in faculty employ
ment; you can't have your cake and eat it too. Paper presented
at the 1979 National Conference on Higher Education, Washington,
D.C., April, 1979.
MacDonald, R. K. Technical report; 1977 survey of the american
professoriate. Storrs: The University of Conneticut, Social
Sciences Data Center, February, 1978.
Newman, F. Can there be anything affirmative about affirmative
action in the 1980's. Paper presented at the 1979 National
Conference on Higher Education, Washington, D.C., April, 1979.
Sandler, B. R. You've come a long way maybe or why it still hurts
to be a woman in labor. Paper presented at the 1979 National
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INSTITUTIONAL ORIGIN:

LABOR MARKET SIGNALING IN HIGHER EDUCATION
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Chairman: Dr. Clifton F. Conrad
In response to the need for further research on promotion and
tenure decisions, this study examined one of the criteria used in
these decisions: inbreeding. Based on an analysis of the academic
marketplace modifying Spence's theory of job market signaling
behavior, the following research hypotheses guided the study:
1) female inbred facility have patterns of productivity which are
significantly different from the patterns of productivity of male
inbred faculty; 2) inbred faculty show less professional advance
ment than noninbred faculty; and, 3) inbred faculty receive fewer
institutional rewards than noninbred faculty.
The data for the research was taken from the 1977 Survey of the
American Professoriate. This instrument was designed and implemented
under the direction of Everett Carll Ladd, Jr. and Seymour Martin
Lipset. Seven statistical hypotheses were tested covering the
productivity of male and female inbred faculty, their professional
advancement, and their rewards. Methodological factors included
a broad operationalization of academic productivity, the use
of multivariate analyses, and the inclusion of a test for the
statistical significance of discrimination in rewards.
The results of the analyses showed that inbred faculty do experience
discrimination in rewards and in some areas of professional advancement.
Significant differences were found in the patterns of productivity
exhibited by female and male inbred faculty members. Women show
higher performance in most traditional institutional areas while
men emphasize external activities. The results indicate that
institutional origin cannot be used as a reliable signal in the
academic labor market.

